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This Article develops a pluralisticaccount of substantive internationalcriminal
law (ICL). Challenging the dominant assumption among theorists and
practitioners, it argues that the search for consistency and uniformity in ICL is
misguided, that the law applicable to internationalcrimes should not be the same
in all cases, and that those guilty of like crimes should not always receive like
sentences. In lieu of a one-size-fits-all criminal law, this Article proposes a
four-tieredmodel of ICL that takes seriously the nationallaws of the state or states
that, under normal circumstances, would be expected to assertjurisdiction over a
case.
After briefly surveying historical complexities concerning the definition and
scope of ICL, the Article focuses on standardjusticationsfor the existence of ICL.
It looks in particularto justifications rooted in international relations, gravity
considerations,and enforcement concerns. While each account provides powerful
reasonsfor seeking uniformity with respect to some components of ICL, neither in
isolation nor in combination do these rationalesdemand uniformity with respect to
the entire content of ICL. In particular, these standard theories have difficulty
explaining why ICL should seek to monopolize those aspects of criminal
responsibility that speak more to the general nature of criminality than to any
specific goal of ICL. A review of general rule-of-law values-includingthe values
of consistency, legality, administration, normative development, and avoiding
jurisdictionalchaos-yields similar results, affirming that contingent domestic law
has a vital role to play in ICL prosecutions.
The Article next undertakes a case study of the Erdemovid decision, in which the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) announced a new rule of ICL rejecting duress as a complete
defense to murder. A close reading of the tribunal's reasoning reveals that the
ICTY would have done better to apply Bosnian law considering the Court's
inability to articulatewhy the special context or purpose of ICL requires a specyiic
result, the normative shortcomings of both the majority and dissent'spositions, and
the availability of a suitable approach under domestic law. The Article then
elaborates upon this analysis to set forth a four-tiered model of substantive ICL
comprising: (1) truly universal principles of ICL, (2) tribunal-specific rules, (3)
rules constraining the acceptable range of domestic discretion, and (4) default
rules. While this model has powerful normativeforce, it also provides a coherent
and superiorframeworkfor understandingthe actual content ofICL in its current
state of development.
INTRODUCTION
The case of Draien Erdemovid presented an early and thorny challenge for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The twentythree-year-old soldier arrived in The Hague after confessing to journalists that, on
July 16, 1995, he had participated in a firing line that executed hundreds of Bosnian
Muslim civilians captured after Bosnian Serb forces overran the U.N.-declared
"safe haven" of Srebrenica.' After initially pleading guilty to a crime against

1. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgement,
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humanity and receiving a ten-year sentence,2 Erdemovid appealed, claiming that he
was excused on account of having committed his crimes under duress.3 According
to his uncontested testimony, which both the prosecution and trial judge accepted
as accurate,4 Erdemovid was a Bosnian Croat living in territory controlled by
separatist Bosnian Serb forces.' He joined the Serb military because it was his only
means of providing for his wife and young child.6 A tolerant, apolitical youth with
no passion for nationalism, Erdemovid volunteered for the Tenth Sabotage
Detachment because the unit included other non-Serbs and was involved in
reconnaissance rather than killing.7 When ordered to shoot the civilians from
Srebrenica, Erdemovid protested.s He only complied after his commanding officer
threatened to make him join the condemned. 9 "[I]f I had been alone," the accused
testified, "if I had not had my wife and a son, I would have fled and something else
would have happened. I had to do that. I was forced to do that." 10 By his estimate,
Erdemovid killed about seventy civilians that day.I1
In deciding the appeal, the ICTY's Appeals Chamber quickly found itself facing
a problem that it was, in fundamental ways, unequipped to resolve. Both the
ICTY's statute and international treaty law were silent on the existence and scope
of the defense of duress.' 2 International judicial precedents were sparse, conflicted,
and typically summary in their reasoning. 3 Domestic criminal justice systems,
4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998); Stephen Engelberg, U.N.
ProsecutorAsks Serbs to Hand Over War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1996, at A7.
2. Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22bis, Sentencing Judgement,
5-6.
3. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, I 11 (Int'l Crim.

Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
4. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22bis, Sentencing Judgment, T 13 ("The parties were
agreed on the facts.. .. (T]he Trial Chamber accepts as fact the version of events which the
parties have submitted, that is that the facts alleged in the indictment and the version of
events described by the accused in his previous testimonies are statements of fact.").
5. Id. 17.
6. See id.
7. Id. 16.
8. Id. 14.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. 15.
12. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, T 51 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997) ("(Djuress, either as a general notion or specifically as it applies to murder, is not
contained in any international treaty or instrument . . . ."); Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case
No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, I I1 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, $ 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovik, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen $ 13 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997).
13. See, e.g., Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, T 43. In particular, the Joint Separate Opinion concluded that
"the only express affirmation of the availability of duress as a defence to the killing of
innocent persons in post-World War Two military tribunal cases appears in the
Einsatzgruppen case before a United States military tribunal." Id. (citing United States v.
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moreover, differed on whether duress could ever provide a complete defense to
murder. Most civil law jurisdictions-including, notably, the laws of the former
Yugoslavia-allowed the defense in these circumstances.1 4 Common law
jurisdictions, with the exception of some U.S. states, denied it for murder."5
The five-judge chamber ultimately issued a divided judgment 6 rejecting duress
as a complete defense for soldiers accused of taking innocent life but directing the
Trial Chamber to consider duress as a potential mitigating factor for sentencing
purposes.' The judgment produced four separately authored opinions that revealed
deep differences in methodology and approach. The judges were divided over
whether to rely on policy arguments or to apply more formalistic reasoning. They
disagreed over whether international law revealed a settled answer and, if it did,
what source of international law provided that answer-or indeed what that answer
ultimately was.' 8
Despite these disagreements, the Appeals Chamber was agreed on one
fundamental point: that international criminal law (ICL) should-and perhaps
must-answer the question. In this way, the Court's judges embraced the dominant
assumption among theorists and practitioners that ICL is, or should aspire to
Ohlendorf ("Einsatzgruppen"), 4 TRIALS

WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
No. 10, at 3 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office 1951) [hereinafter T.W.C.]). The opinion further noted, however, that this decision
"did not cite any authority for its opinion that duress may constitute a complete defence to
killing an innocent individual." Id. T 43. With respect to other precedents invoked by the
defense, the Joint Separate Opinion reasoned that the cases were either distinguishable based
on the nature of the accusation or too unclear in their reasoning to provide guidance in the
case at hand. Id.
47-48 (collecting cases). In addition, the opinion concluded that the
post-World War II military tribunals generally resorted to national rather than international
law with respect to the specific question of duress. Id. 54 ("[Tlhere was no provision in
OF

MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW

either the 1945 London Charter or in Control Council Law No.10 which addressed the
question of duress either generally or as a defence to the killing of innocent persons.
Consequently, when these tribunals had to determine that specific issue, they invariably drew
on the jurisprudence of their own national jurisdictions. This is evidenced by the fact that
British military tribunals followed British law and the United States military tribunals
followed United States law.").
14. See, e.g., id. 59 (surveying national laws and concluding that "[t]he penal codes of

civil law systems, with some exceptions, consistently recognise duress as a complete defence
to all crimes").
15. See, e.g., id. 1 43 ("The laws of all but a handful of state jurisdictions in the United
States definitively reject duress as a complete defence for a principal in the first degree to

murder."); id. 49 (noting that some U.S. states had accepted the defense of duress as a
general defense for all crimes); id. (noting that British and Canadian military tribunals had
rejected the defense).

16. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, 17 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) ("[Tjhe members of the Appeals Chamber
differ on a number of issues, both as to reasoning and as to result. Consequently, the views
of each of the members of the Appeals Chamber on particular issues are set out in detail in
Separate Opinions .... ").

17. Id. TT 19-21. On remand, the Trial Chamber reduced Erdemovid's sentence to five
years. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment,
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998).
18. See infra notes 61-66; infra Part IV.A.-B.
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become, a comprehensive and closed body of criminal law, one that exists apart
from any particular domestic criminal law and, with the exception of forumspecific procedural rules, applies uniform standards to all aspects of criminal
behavior that fall within its ambit, whether it be specific elements of crimes, the
general standards of individual liability, or the principles of sentencing. 19 For
many-including most of the authors of the Erdemovid appellate decision-this
assumption goes unstated.20 It is simply self-evident that ICL must fill gaps in the
law and that there can be one, and only one, answer supplied. Others who have
given the matter more explicit attention have portrayed the quest for uniformity and
consistency as central to the very integrity of ICL, constituting a core requirement
of fairness and the rule of law. 21
In this Article, I challenge the idea that ICL does, or should require, uniformity
in all aspects of its doctrine and practice. I argue that the search for consistency and
uniformity is misguided, that the law applicable to international crimes should not
be the same in all cases, that those culpable of like crimes should not receive like
sentences in all cases, and that this result may in fact better serve the core purposes
of ICL than the alternative. I argue for a hybrid or "pluralistic" model of ICL that

19. As in the Erdemovid Appeals Chamber opinions, this view often reveals itself as a
background assumption, needing no specific interrogation. For authorities specifically
highlighting the value of uniform ICL in various contexts, see, for example, Prosecutor v.
Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment 1756 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 20, 2001) ("One of the fundamental elements in any rational and fair system of criminal
justice is consistency in punishment."); Robert Cryer, Royalism and the King: Article 21 of
the Rome Statute and the Politics of Sources, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 390, 394 (2009)
(advocating the "judicial wing of the ICC promoting an integrated, consistent regime of
international criminal law"); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty
Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,Command Responsibility, and the Development of
InternationalCriminalLaw, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 96-97 (2005) (arguing that judges should
construe both substantive and procedural aspects of international criminal law consistently in

order to develop ICL's legitimacy); Margaret McAullife deGuzman, Article 21, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE By ARTICLE 701, 710 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter

deGuzman, Article 21] (arguing that the International Criminal Court's resort to general
principles of law under Article 21 of the Rome Statute "should be determined on the basis of
international law rather than a case by case determination of a particular State's rules of
jurisdiction. A particularized approach would undermine the consistent application of the
law to different accused."); David S. Koller, The Faithof the InternationalCriminalLawyer,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1019, 1026 n.16 (2008) (noting that the developed and
recognized justification for international criminal law is an outgrowth of human rights law,
and that such law must be applied consistently); lnbs M6nica Weinberg de Roca &
Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 1, 8 (2008) (appealing to "fundamental principals [sic] of criminal law, including
the tenet that similar cases should be treated alike").
20. As I discuss below, Judge Antonio Cassese's dissenting opinion did contemplate the
application of domestic law as "a last resort." Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); see infra text accompanying notes 75-76; infra text accompanying
note 182.
21. See supra note 19.
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does not assume ICL to be a closed system of criminal law, but that instead takes
seriously the domestic laws of the state or states which, under normal
circumstances, would be expected to assert jurisdiction over a case. In short, I
believe that the ICTY should have applied former-Yugoslav law to Erdemovid's
duress defense, and that the reasons for doing so have additional implications for
other aspects of ICL.
My argument proceeds from the acknowledgment that ICL operates in an
irreducibly pluralistic environment. Its creation inevitably perpetuates or even
creates inconsistencies and tensions in the domestic criminal justice systems to
which it applies. On the one hand, the drive towards unification and consistency at
the international level necessarily creates fracture and inconsistency at the domestic
level. This is true in the obvious sense that international law is meant to bind states:
for example, the international prohibition of genocide22 necessarily sits in tension
with the laws of states that seek to legalize and encourage genocidal practices.
That, of course, is the point. But the creation of a comprehensive and unified
international legal system also creates other, less obvious, tensions with domestic
criminal law. Even if domestic laws do not directly conflict with international
criminal prohibitions, the development of a distinct international criminal law
specific to international crimes can threaten the integrity of a state's criminal justice
system by causing the state to adopt principles for international crimes that are
inconsistent with those otherwise applied. After all, the successful prosecution of
an international crime from start to finish necessarily involves the application of a
variety of legal principles that may bear little relationship to the particular criteria
that define a crime as international. These include, for example, the minimum
mental element necessary to establish criminal culpability, the proper scope of
duress as an excuse to murder, the correct balance between free speech rights and
the criminal law, and the appropriate measure of punishment for the crime. These
are all matters that also arise outside the area of international criminal law, and
their appropriate resolution, at least as a prima facie matter, does not hinge on
whether a crime happens to be international. In the context of domestic criminal
law, moreover, states can and do take divergent approaches to these matters without
violating applicable international obligations, including those imposed by
international human rights law.
Thus, the creation of a distinctly international criminal law presents an oftenignored dilemma. The development of a comprehensive, unified body of law for
international law provides consistency only within the closed universe of
international crimes: those accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and other international offenses are to be treated in the same way and
become subject to the same rules no matter what their nationality or where in the
world their crimes have occurred. But this consistency comes at the price of
inconsistency at the domestic level. A person who might be excused from murder
on account of duress may lose this excuse because the underlying crime is
categorized as an international crime. The perpetrator of an international crime
receives a sentence greater or lesser than what the relevant national court imposes

22. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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on those who commit crimes of equal gravity under the domestic law. To the extent
these differences are not justified by any substantive differences in the underlying
crimes, the result may seem incoherent and even unjust.
At a minimum, these reflections reveal that it is not self-evident that
international criminal law must take the form of a uniform, all-encompassing body
that trumps contrary domestic laws in every instance. The choice instead is between
two kinds of pluralism, one that imposes diverse and potentially inconsistent
obligations at the domestic level, and one that imposes them at the international
level. The question of which pluralism is preferable, or more accurately, what is the
right balance between the two, is one that requires closer analysis and specific
justification. I argue in this Article that there are many reasons-including those
rooted in ICL's purposes, its legitimacy, and its normative limits-to take
applicable domestic law seriously in ICL prosecutions.
My argument takes shape against the background of recent focus on the
phenomenon of pluralism in international law. 23 Whether under this label or not,
ICL scholars have paid close attention, in both theory and practice, to the
competing interests of domestic and international authority in the prosecution of
serious crimes. The International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, operates
according to the principle of complementarity, which privileges domestic
prosecutions of ICL offenses and positions the ICC as a court of last resort in the
event that domestic efforts prove inadequate. 24 Various hybrid tribunals rooted in
cooperation between international and domestic authorities have also emerged,
and a scholarly literature has emerged to address these and other questions
concerning the relationship between the local and the international.26

23. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155
(2007).
24. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing that the ICC shall
only exercise jurisdiction if a state is "unwilling" or "unable" itself to prosecute).
25. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Sierra Leone Statute]; Agreement Between the United Nations and
the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329
U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter ECCC Statute]; S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25,
1999) (United Nations Security Council's creation of a Special Transitional Administration
in East Timor); S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter
Lebanon Statute] (United Nations Security Council's creation of a Special Tribunal for
Lebanon).
26. See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2007); JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS (Ruth Mackenzie, Cesare P.R. Romano & Philippe Sands eds.,
2008); Jo STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY (2008); Jos6 E. Alvarez,
Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999);
Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National
Courts Through TransnationalNetworks, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2009); William W. BurkeWhite, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts
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This Article contributes to this literature by interrogating the implications of
domestic pluralism for substantive ICL. Unlike other scholarly efforts, this Article
does not focus primarily on the procedural setting of ICL. My focus is not the
comparative value of domestic actors or of domestic trials, but instead, the
comparative value of substantive domestic criminal law. Nor does my argument
focus on the special dilemmas of transitional justice as a reason to justify local
alternatives-such as amnesty or various forms of alternative justice-to
international solutions. Although I have given this critical question greater attention
in my prior work, the focus of this Article is on the application of ICL in its
"ideal" context: by a court--either international or domestic-that is fully
committed to the prosecution of ICL offenses, undistracted by other mitigating
considerations. While the particularities of transitional justice and mass atrocity
may justify even greater departures from a one-size-fits-all approach to
international criminal justice, I argue that a case for pluralism exists even within a
more traditional concept of ICL that emphasizes individual responsibility
irrespective of the broader considerations underlying the transitional justice debate.
The argument proceeds in six parts. Part I sets the stage by framing the debate
over the sources of ICL in its historical context. This Part provides a working
definition of ICL and summarizes the difficulties that international criminal
tribunals have faced in identifying the content of ICL. As part of this analysis, I
outline the existing relevance of domestic law to ICL decisions, and I consider the
impact that the ICC has had on the development of ICL.
Parts II and III consider various justifications for the development of ICL as a
uniform body of law. Part II focuses on specific rationales for the creation of ICL
as a distinct but limited body of criminal law and, in particular, on theories based
on international relations, gravity, and enforcement. I argue that, while each
account may claim some role in the content of ICL, neither in isolation nor in
combination do they compel ICL to assert a monopoly over the substantive law
applicable to the prosecution of ICL crimes. To the contrary, I argue that the best
justification for ICL in its present state of development favors a model of so-called
"double complementarity," rooted in qualified deference to both domestic
prosecutions and the application of substantive domestic law.
Part III looks to general legal values that, although not specific to ICL, might
nevertheless compel uniformity in the law. These include the values of equality,
legality, administration, normative development, and the avoidance ofjurisdictional
chaos. Here too, I conclude that the case for a uniform ICL is not as strong as it
might appear, and that, on balance, these considerations supply powerful reasons to
incorporate contingent domestic law principles into ICL prosecutions.

in the Rome System of InternationalJustice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (2008); William W.
Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MicH. J. INT'L L. 963 (2004); Jenia
lontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L.
REv. 985 (2007).
27. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative
Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107 (2009) [hereinafter
Greenawalt, Complementarity]; Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics?
ProsecutorialDiscretionand the InternationalCriminal Court,39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
583 (2007) (hereinafter Greenawalt, Justice].
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Part IV considers the competing interests of international and domestic criminal
law in the specific context of the Erdemovid case. I argue that the problem of duress
presents a compelling case for resorting to applicable domestic law, given: (1) the
silence of authoritative international legal sources concerning whether duress can
be a complete defense to murder; (2) the disagreement among national legal
systems over this question; (3) the ICTY Appeals Chamber's inability to articulate
why the special context or purpose of ICL requires a particular approach to duress;
(4) the normative shortcomings of both the majority and dissent's positions (and,
indeed, of the prevailing national law approaches to duress); and (5) the availability
of a suitable approach under applicable domestic law.
Part V expands this analysis beyond the problem of duress to advance a hybrid
model of ICL that incorporates both universal principles of international law and,
within limits, the domestic criminal law of the state that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the offense. In particular, I argue that ICL should be
reconceptualized as a four-tiered body of law embracing four categories of
substantive rules: (1) truly universal principles of ICL, (2) tribunal-specific rules,
(3) rules constraining the acceptable range of domestic discretion, and (4) default
rules. Although I do not attempt a comprehensive application of the model, I
provide examples of rules belonging to each category, and I identify several
areas-including modes of individual culpability, standards of mens rea, and
sentencing practices-where domestic law has a legitimate role to play. Finally, I
briefly consider the implications of the framework in three different procedural
settings: domestic courts, international tribunals, and hybrid courts.
I. THE CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: BACKGROUND AND SOURCES

A. Defining InternationalCriminalLaw
At a rudimentary level, there is nothing in the idea of international obligations
pertaining to the criminal law that requires an exhaustive criminal code. According
to a broad and literal definition of the phrase, international criminal law could be
said to comprise any number of obligations impacting criminal law. For example,
international obligations restricting the extraterritorial reach of domestic crimes
could be said to constitute ICL.2 8 Similarly, the entirety of international human
rights law-ofien described as a distinct field-belongs to ICL to the extent that
human rights law imposes obligations or constraints on states' administration of
their criminal justice systems. 29 For these purposes, it does not matter that the
obligations may directly bind states rather than individuals, that they apply to
ordinary domestic offenses, or indeed, that the same human rights obligations
regulating criminal law also extend to other areas. It is enough that a legal

28. See infra Part Il.E.
29. See, e.g., STEvEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMs & JAMES L. BISCHOFF,
AccoUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: BEYOND THE
NUREMBERG LEGACY 12-13 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that to the extent it "address[es]
accountability of the individual for [its) violation," human rights law "overlap[s] with
international criminal law").
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obligation arising under international law imposes some constraint on the
permissible content of some aspect of domestic criminal law.
Notwithstanding the availability of this broader concept, discussion of ICL
typically focuses on a narrower area of law dealing with specific offenses that are
directly proscribed by international law. For example, the authors of a leading
casebook define ICL as the law that "imposes criminal responsibility on individuals
for certain violations of public international law."30 David Luban has similarly
characterized these offenses as "'pure international crimes,'-pure, in that their
criminal character originated in international rather than domestic law, and
international rather than domestic legal institutions."3' A paradigmatic example is
genocide, which the Genocide Convention defines as "a crime under international
law." 32 The treaty provides a definition of the offense, and it obligates the
contracting parties to "undertake to prevent and to punish" genocide.33 Other
international offenses, each with its own origin and evolution, include crimes
against humanity,34 war crimeS,35 torture,3 piracy," and aggression.
While this Article focuses primarily on this narrower body of international law,
one's precise definition of ICL depends in part upon the very questions that this
Article explores. To say that ICL assigns individual criminal responsibility39 still
leaves open a range of questions regarding state discretion over the enforcement
and definition of international offenses. What law, for example, should govern the
punishment of international offenses? Do states have any latitude to incorporate
general principles of domestic law in ICL prosecutions? Must states prosecute ICL
crimes as ICL crimes, or is it sufficient that domestic law also criminalizes the
behavior targeted by ICL? On account of these and other complexities, I believe it
is useful to also keep sight of the looser, more ecumenical concept of ICL. Indeed,
part of my argument is that the distinctions between different types of ICL are less
airtight than they might appear.
The prosecution of ICL offenses has often coincided with the establishment of
special international courts. The history of modern ICL begins with the Nuremberg

30. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS I (2d ed. 2010); see also RATNER ET AL., supra note
29, at 10 ("For our purposes, the term refers broadly to the international law assigning
criminal responsibility for certain particularly serious violations of international law.").
31. David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction,Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law 5 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 1154117,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 154177.
32. Genocide Convention, supra note 22, at art. I.
33, Id.
34. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 7.
35. Id. at art. 8.
36. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
37. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 5; Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers, and Charter of the
Intemational Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
39. See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supranote 30, at 1.
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and Tokyo tribunals, established after World War I to prosecute senior German
and Japanese officials for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression.40 Successor ad hoc tribunals include the international courts created by
the U.N. Security Council to address crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia41
and in Rwanda 42 in the 1990s and various "hybrid" courts that reflect cooperation
between domestic authorities and international institutions, including a mix of local
and foreign judges.43 Recent years have also seen the establishment and operation
of a permanent tribunal, the International Criminal Court." Generally speaking,
these successor tribunals all focus on a core trio of ICL offenses: genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. 45 The ICC's Statute provides for jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression contingent upon the State Parties agreeing on how to
define the offense. Some hybrid tribunals also have jurisdiction over select
domestic offenses.
ICL offenses are also sometimes prosecuted in domestic courts. Some states
employ expansive jurisdictional rules with respect to offenses prescribed by
international law. For example, like many other countries, the United States
recognizes the principle of universal jurisdiction over "the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations." 48 Other states recognize universal jurisdiction over a
broader range of offenses, including the core three that have been the focus of
recent international tribunals. 49
B. Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Searchfor Sources

While the existence of distinct ICL offenses is neither new nor controversial,
much of the modern history of ICL has been consumed by an identity crisis
regarding the content and sources of these offenses. Gaps in the law are an endemic
aspect of judicial decision making, but with ICL the gaps have at times appeared to
swallow the rules. The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nurembergso provided only bare bones descriptions of the three crimes that the

40. London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]; Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20.
41. See S.C. Res. 827, 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute] (establishing the ICTY).
42. See S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute] (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)).
43. See supra note 25.
44. See Rome Statute, supra note 24.

45. See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 25, arts. 2-4; Rome Statute, supra note 24, at
arts. 5-8; ECCC Statute, supra note 25 arts. 4-6; ICTR Statute, supra note 42, at arts. 2-4;
ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at arts. 2-5.
46. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 5.
47. See, e.g., Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 25, art. 5 (crimes under Sierra Leonean
Law); ECCC Statute, supra note 25, art. 3.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
49. See generally UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION. NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION
OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
50. London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
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court would prosecute, and two of these-"crimes against humanity" and "crimes
against peace"-had no established history as ICL offenses.si The Charter was also
largely silent on the general principles that would govern culpability
determinations. It excluded the defense of acting under orders, denied the
availability of official immunity, and-perhaps most controversially-set out a
broad conspiracy liability that was largely unknown outside the United States legal
system at that point in history.52 The Charter did not, however, elucidate such basic
questions as the mental and causation standards applicable to individual culpability,
the justifications and excuses that might provide complete or partial defenses, or
the standards regulating criminal sentences. Nor did the Charter specify what
methodology the tribunal should apply to address questions left unanswered by the
text of the Charter. All these issues were left to the discretion of the tribunal and its
successors to elucidate on a case-by-case basis, often through decisions that were
less than lucid in their legal reasoning.5 3
The post-Cold War tribunals have stood on somewhat firmer ground given the
benefit of the Nuremberg precedents and the intervening evolution and codification
of ICL through treaties such as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva
Conventions. In many ways, however, ICL had not advanced between 1945 and
1993. The statutes of the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (hereinafter London Charter].
51. See Jonathan A. Bush, "The Supreme . . . Crime" and Its Origins: The Lost
Legislative History of the Crime ofAggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2324 (2002); Beth
Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37
CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999) (hereinafter Van Schaack, Definition of Crimes
Against Humanity].
52. See London Charter, supra note 50, at arts. 7-9; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY
OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 36 (1992) ("The Anglo-American concept
of conspiracy was not part of European legal systems and arguably not an element of the

internationally recognized laws of war."). Post-Nuremberg tribunals have excluded direct
reference to conspiracy outside the context of genocide. See Per Saland, International
Criminal Law Principles,in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE 189, 199 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (noting with respect to the drafting of the
International Criminal Court's statute that "[a]nother very divisive issue . .. was conspiracy,
a concept strongly advocated by common law countries but unknown in some civil law
systems").
53. The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, for instance,

provided only brief and summary explanations of its verdicts with regard to each of the
tribunal's twenty-two defendants. More broadly, efforts to derive rules of customary

international law from World War II-era cases have commonly struggled with the lack of
reasoning in key decisions. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T,

Judgment, T 201 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (for purposes
of identifying elements of aiding and abetting, noting that the British military court decision
in Trial of Schonfeld and Nine Others "did not make clear the grounds on which it found
[three of the accused] to have been 'concerned in the killing"'); Case No. 002/19-09-2007ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 38), Public Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-InvestigatingJudges
Order on Joint CriminalEnterprise (CE), T 75 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of

Cambodia May 20, 2010) (noting that ICTY jurisprudence concerning extended forms of
joint criminal enterprise as a mode of criminal liability relied on military court cases in
which "the military courts only issued a simple guilty verdict and made no extensive legal
finding on the issue of common plan or mob beatings"); supra note 13 (Erdemovi case).
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(ICTR) followed the basic Nuremberg model of listing bare bones offenses, with
many of the core standards of culpability and punishment left unspecified.5 4 in its
early case law, the ICTY and ICTR's shared Appeals Chamber announced that it
would resolve questions of applicable law by looking to the classic sources of
international law outlined in Article 38(1) of the Statute for the International Court
of Justice.55 Namely, it would look to (1) "international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states," (2) "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law," (3) "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," and (4),
failing the above, "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations." 56
This approach raises immediate prima facie questions considering the special
context of ICL. Is the same methodology that is used to determine disputes between
states also appropriate for assessing individual criminal liability-in which the
rights of the accused loom larger?" The picture clouds further when one considers
that, in practice, international tribunals have construed these traditional sources
loosely, and in ways that expand judicial discretion. For instance, the classical
definition of customary international law requires widespread and consistent state
practice accompanied by a sense of legal obligation (so-called "opinio juris").58
Questions regarding the consistency of both requirements, and the mix between the
two, remain debated,59 but the ad hoc tribunals have routinely relied on so-called
custom, sourced from little more than a handful of Nuremberg-era precedents
prosecuted by the Allied Powers against perpetrators who fought against them. 0 in

54. See ICTR Statute, supra note 42; ICTY Statute, supra note 41.
55. See Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Declaration of Judge Patrick
Robinson, 1 281 at n.10 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000);
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Declaration of Judge David Hunt, 2 at
n.I (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Erdemovid,
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 40
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
56. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
57. See Benjamin Perrin, Searchingfor Law While Seeking Justice: The Djifculties of
Enforcing HumanitarianLaw in InternationalCriminal Trials, 39 OTTAWA L. REV. 367,
372-73 (2007-2008) ("The implications of the modern ad hoc tribunals incorporating these

public international law concepts into international criminal law have been largely
ignored.").
58. See ANTHoNY A. D'AMATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49
(1971); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2d ed. 1912) ("Jurists speak of a
custom, when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up under the
agis of the conviction that these actions are legally necessary or legally right.").
59. See generally Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the

Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REv. 65, 76-77 (2007) (summarizing controversies
concerning the identification of custom); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland Modern
Approaches to Customary InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 75760 (2001) (distinguishing between traditional and modern approaches to customary
international law).
60. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, %191, 193
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other cases, the tribunals have dispensed with even the pretense of following
custom or general principles to fashion legal standards that ostensibly best suit the
purpose of ICL .
The impact of judicial construction has hardly been trivial. With little or vague
guidance from treaty law, the ad hoc tribunals have, among other important
decisions, developed an expansive form of liability known as joint criminal
enterprise (JCE), 62 elaborated elements of command responsibility,63 ruled that the
laws and customs of war apply to internal conflicts and not merely to wars between
states," developed principles of sentencing,6 and, as I have already addressed,
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (identifying standards of aiding

and abetting liability based on World War II-era case law after reasoning that "[s]ince no
treaty law on the subject exists, the Trial Chamber must examine customary international
law in order to establish the content of this head of criminal responsibility" and "[i]t
therefore becomes necessary to examine the case law").
61. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of

Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 1 77 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997) (appealing to policy considerations).
62. The ICTY Appeals Chamber first announced this doctrine in the Tadi6 case. See

Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). Pursuant to this mode of participation, an accused is held
criminally responsible for an international crime based on his or her participation, with the
requisite mens rea, in a common plan among a plurality of persons to commit the crime. See

id. 1 227-28. Most controversially, the Court held that participants in a JCE are also liable
for crimes outside the common plan committed by other members of the group so long as the
commission of the offense was foreseeable and the accused knowingly took the risk of its
occurrence. Id 1228. On the controversy surrounding the ICTY's development of JCE, see,
for example, MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY 48-90 (2009); Danner &
Martinez, supra note 19; Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal
Enterprise at the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT'L CRIM.
L. REv. 167 (2005); David L. Nersessian, Whoops, I Committed Genocide! The Anomaly of
Constructive Liability for Serious International Crimes, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81
(2006); Jens David Ohlin, Joint Criminal Confusion, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 406 (2009); Jens
David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine ofJoint Criminal Enterprise,5
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007); Steven Powles, Joint CriminalEnterprise: CriminalLiability
by ProsecutorialIngenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004);
Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International CriminalLaw, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
925 (2008).

63. See Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib, for the
Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). See generally Mirjan Damabka,
The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. 1. CoMp. L. 455 (2001); Danner &
Martinez, supra note 19.
64. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 137 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995).
65. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A,

Judgment, 1057 (Nov. 28, 2007) ("[Tlhe Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that, in view
of the gravity of the crimes in respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, the two main
purposes of sentencing are retribution and deterrence; the purpose of rehabilitation should
not be given undue weight."); Sharharn Dana, Genocide, Reconciliation and Sentencing in
the Jurisprudence of the ICTY, in THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE 259, 261 (Ralph
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ruled that duress cannot excuse soldiers of homicidal war crimes or crimes against
humanity. These decisions had varying degrees of support in treaty law and prior
precedent, but each involved substantial judicial evolution of the law.
The Erdemovid decision denying duress as a complete defense to murdet ranks
among these examples both for its importance and for its controversial outcome.
The case presents, in the words of one scholar, a "microcosm of the difficulties of
enforcing international humanitarian law through international criminal trials." 66 In
that decision, the ICTY's five-member Appeals Chamber proceeded from the
unanimous conclusion that neither the ICTY statute nor international treaties
resolved whether Erdemovi6 could be excused. The majority further failed to find
a settled answer to the question in either prior international case law or in a survey
of national criminal laws that might have evidenced a general principle of law
regarding duress.68 As I shall detail in Part IV, the majority therefore appealed to
policy considerations to rule that international law must reject a complete defense
where the killing of innocents is concerned.
Judge Cassese, by contrast, argued in dissent that existing customary
international law could, in fact, afford a complete defense of duress, subject to a
strict proportionality test requiring that the accused not cause a greater harm than
avoided.6 9 This conclusion, however, relied on highly formalistic reasoning.
Proceeding from the observation that all legal systems recognize duress as a
complete defense to some crimes, Cassese characterized the relevant question as
one regarding whether international law recognizes a murder-based exception to the
defense of duress.70 Because there was disagreement on this question, Cassese
reasoned that no rule of customary international law had crystallized and that the
general rule favoring the defense of duress must prevail. 7' This result effectively
reduced the content of ICL to a semantic characterization of the background rule
Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007) ("Some trial chambers added two more principles to
create 'four parameters' for international sentencing: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and protection of society.").
66. Perrin, supra note 57, at 388.
67. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 1 51 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997) ("[D]uress, either as a general notion or specifically as it applies to murder, is not
contained in any international treaty or instrument . . . ."); Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case
No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, T 11 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, 1 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 1 13 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997).
68. See Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah, IT 43-48; Erdemovie, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Li, 1 3-10.
69. See Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Cassese, % 11-12; id. 50 (concluding that "whether the execution ... was proportionateto
the harm . . . sought to [be] avoid[ed]" is a necessary element of the duress rule (emphasis
added)).
70. Id. 19.
7 1. Id. 11.
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rather than a reflection of actual consensus among international or domestic
sources. 72
C. The Role ofDomestic Law

The determination of such critical questions through case-by-case evolution,
retroactively applied, has raised its share of controversy.7 3 Yet, despite its obvious
potential to alleviate at least some of this concern, the option of applying domestic
criminal law has thus far played only a minor role in these debates.
Domestic law has obvious importance to the traditional sources of international
law. Identifying rules of customary international law and the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations routinely involves consideration of national
legal obligations. In these cases, however, the goal of the interpretive exercise is to
announce a single, universal rule of international law and not to give effect to any
particular domestic law. Moreover, the ICL case law has given even this limited
use of domestic law diminished status, privileging the prior case law of
international tribunals over domestic law.7 4
By contrast, states like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda do, of course, apply
their own particular criminal laws to cases arising in their own courts. Had the
Bosnian authorities apprehended Erdemovid in like circumstances for a mass
murder that did not implicate ICL-say for example, a domestic criminal gang had
kidnapped him and had forced him to kill the family members of rival gang
members-then Bosnia would have applied its own domestic criminal law to
adjudicate Erdemovi6's duress defense. Why shouldn't the ICTY also have applied
Bosnian law when faced when with a gap in ICL?

72. See, for instance, Perrin,supra note 57, at 386, who argues:
The logic applied by Judge Cassese on this point is questionable. It could just
as easily be argued that a general rule of international criminal law is that the
individual criminal responsibility of an accused can only be justified or excused
based on a defence recognized under international law. Since duress is not
recognized as a defence to the offences charged, and Judge Cassese falls short
of finding a specific rule permitting duress as a defence to the killing of
innocent persons, then the purported defence would not exist.
Id,
73. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT'L CluM. JUST. 539, 556 (2005)

(identifying "fundamental concerns that lead us vigorously to oppose the reliance on
[customary international law] as [a] means of inculpation in criminal prosecutions, whether
in domestic courts or international courts"); Robinson, supra note 62.
74. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 1 196 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (determining principles of aiding and
abetting liability based on review of international tribunal case law and observing that
British military court case law applying domestic law is "less helpful in establishing rules of
international law on this issue"); Erdemovi4, CaseNo. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting

Opinion of Judge Cassese, $ 3 ("[TJhe traditional attitude of international courts to nationallaw notions suggests that one should explore all the means available at the international level
before turning to national law.").
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To date, the direct use of domestic law has received only limited, half-hearted
support in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. In his Erdemovi,
opinion, Judge Cassese characterized the direct application of former Yugoslav law
as an application of "last resort."75 He saw reliance on contingent domestic law as a
regrettable, but potentially necessary, step to avoid retroactive punishment and thus
protect the principle of nullem crimen sine lege. Although Cassese was confident
that there was, in fact, an established ICL law of duress, he would have applied
domestic law before explicitly fashioning a brand new rule based on policy
considerations, as the plurality had done.n
The statutes of the ICTY and ICTR also extend a limited embrace of domestic
law. They contain parallel sentencing provisions providing that, "[i]n determining
the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of' the former Rwanda and
Yugoslavia, respectively.7 8 The case law interpreting these provisions, however,
has been rather dismissive of this legal mandate, emphasizing both the nonbinding
phrasing of the obligation,7 9 and the limited force of the legality principle as a
constraint on sentences exceeding that authorized by domestic law.80
D. The Impact of the InternationalCriminal Court
The recent establishment of the ICC is a significant new chapter in the
development of ICL, and it presents yet another context in which questions
regarding the sources of ICL will arise. This institution is marked, first of all, by its
potential universality. Unlike its predecessor, ad hoc tribunals, the ICC has the
potential to reach ICL offenses committed anywhere in the world after the Court's
July 2002 effective date.'

75. See Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Cassese, T49.
76. Id. 11.
77. Id. 49.

78. ICTR Statute, supranote 42, at art. 23; ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at art. 24.
79. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A,
Judgment, $ 1063 (Nov. 28, 2007) ("The Trial Chamber is therefore 'entitled to impose a
greater or lesser sentence than that which would have been imposed by the Rwandan
courts."' (quoting Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Appeal Judgment, 393
(May 20, 2005))); Prosecutor v. Jokid, Case No. IT-01-42/1-A, Judgment on Sentencing
Appeal, 38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 30, 2005) ("[The Statute]
'does not oblige the Trial Chambers to conform to [Yugoslav sentencing] practice; it only
obliges the Trial Chambers to take account of that practice."' (quoting Omar Serushago v.
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Sentencing Appeal Judgment, T 30 (Apr. 6, 2000))).
80. See Prosecutor v. Blagkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 1 681 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) ("[T]he International Tribunal can impose a
sentence in excess of that which would be applicable under relevant law in the former
Yugoslavia, and the Appeals Chamber has held that this sentencing practice does not violate
the principle of nulla poena sine lege because an accused must have been aware that the
crimes for which he is indicted are the most serious violations of international humanitarian
law, punishable by the most severe of penalties." (citation omitted)).
81. The Court's jurisdiction is generally limited to crimes committed on the territory of,
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The ICC also differs from its predecessorsby virtue of the relative clarity of its
governing law. Reflecting a conscious attempt to reduce gaps in the applicable law,
the Rome Statute is a comparatively detailed document. In addition to a host of
procedural and administrative provisions, the statute refines the definitions of the
offenses subject to its jurisdiction, in some cases embracing the case law of the ad
hoc tribunals, and in other cases departing from or expanding upon those
precedents.8 2 Even more remarkable, the statute dedicates unprecedented attention
to the general part of criminal law.83 It includes provisions defining the applicable
mens rea8 and the forms of individual criminal responsibility.s5 It expressly
addresses the problem of duress by adopting the approach set forth in Cassese's
Erdemovid dissent: duress may supply a complete defense to international crimes
"provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one
sought to be avoided."8 The statute also enumerates and defines additional
defenses, including self-defense, the defense of others, involuntary intoxication,
mental incapacity, superior orders, and mistake of fact.8 7
For these reasons, one might expect the establishment of the ICC to eliminate
the historical difficulties surrounding the sources of ICL But this expectation
would be mistaken. In the first place, even the relatively detailed provisions of the
Rome Statute will require judicial construction." The Court's early case law has
just begun to elaborate the elements of crimes and standards of individual liability.
For example, in the Court's first decision confirming charges against a suspect, the
presiding Pre-Trial Chamber dedicated substantial analysis to establishing
standards of so-called coperpetrator liability, rejecting what it termed the subjective
and objective approaches to distinguishing between principals and accessories to a
crime in favor of an approach that treats as coperpetrators those who exercised joint
control over the offense. 9 The operative provision of the Rome Statute, by
or by a citizen of, one of its 114 States Parties, see Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 12,
but a referral from the U.N. Security Council removes that restriction, see id at art. 13.
82. See id. at arts. 5-10. In particular, the statute eschews its predecessors' open-ended
mandate to prosecute unenumerated "violations of the laws and customs of war." London
Charter, supra note 50, at art. 6; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at art. 3. Instead it
provides detailed lists-one for international conflicts and another for internal conflicts-of
prosecutable war crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 8. The definition of crimes
against humanity also receives further refinement, including an expanded list of acts that
qualify for prosecution under this category, provided they are committed as part of a
"widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population." Id at art. 7.
83. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at arts. 22-33.
84. Id. at art. 30.
85. Id. at art. 25.
86. Id. at art. 31(1)(d).
87. Id at art. 31.
88. See Claus Kre8, The InternationalCriminal Court as a Turning Point in the History
of InternationalCriminal Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 143, 146 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) ("Th[e] unprecedented emphasis on the

legality principle (in the Rome Statute] should not detract from the fact that the ICC
definitions of crimes are nevertheless vague in many respects. Judges interpreting these
definitions will therefore need to flesh out and concretize the precise scope of these crimes.")
89. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, $ 322-67 (Jan. 29, 2007). Notably, this decision declined to
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contrast, simply assigns liability to those who commit a crime "jointly with
another . .. person."" Already, the decisions of different Pre-Trial Chambers have
revealed a split over the minimum mens rea generally required to secure conviction
under the Statute.9 '
The principles of sentencing, to take another example, are likewise vague and
untested. The Statute authorizes a maximum life sentence 9 -followed by a secondhighest sentence of thirty years 93-but it leaves the broader question of sentencing
philosophy, including the development of concrete guidelines for sentencing,
largely to the discretion of judges. The Statute's own sentencing philosophy boils
down to the vague instruction that "[i]n determining the sentence, the Court shall,
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, take into account such
factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted

embrace the more expansive concept of perpetrator liability recognized by the ICTY under
the category of "joint criminal enterprise." Id. T 329-30 (contrasting the ICTY's "subjective
approach" according to which "those who make their contribution with the shared intent to
commit the offence can be treated as principals to the crime, regardless of the level of their
contribution to its commission" with "the concept of control over the crime" according to
which those who "control or mastermind [the crime's) commission" are treated as
principals). The Pre-Trial Chamber's analysis focused on the assignment of principal
liability and did not therefore determine the boundaries of accessory liability under the Rome
Statute. See id. $$ 336-37 (distinguishing coperpetrator liability from the "residual form of
accessory liability" provided for by Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute). For additional
precedents concerning co-perpetrator liability, see Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No.
ICC-01105-01108, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (June 15, 2009); Prosecutor v.
Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges (Sept. 30, 2008). The ICC's Appeals Chamber has yet to rule on these issues.
90. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 25(3)(a).
91. CompareLubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges, $ 344 (interpreting statutory definition of intent to encompass situations in which
"co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing the common plan (which is
specifically directed at the achievement of a non-criminal goal) will result in the commission
of the crime, and (b) accept such an outcome"), with Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of
the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, $1 357-60 (ruling that the statutory
standard of "intent" and "knowledge" excludes liability based on "dolus eventualis . . . ,
recklessness or any lower form of culpability" and encompasses only situations in which the
suspect either "carries out ... acts or omissions with the purposeful will (intent) or desire to
bring about those material elements of the crime" or with the "aware(ness] that those
elements will be the almost inevitable outcome of his acts or omissions"). The cited portions
of these decisions concern Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which provides the default mens
rea requirement of intent and knowledge applicable "[u]nless otherwise provided." See
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 30(1). This standard does not therefore have force with
respect to determinations for which the Statute explicitly provides a lower mens rea standard.
See, e.g., id. at art. 28(a)(i) (providing for liability of military commanders for failure to
prevent or repress the crimes of subordinates in cases where the commander "either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes").
92. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 77(1)(b).
93. Id. at art. 77(1)(a).
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person." 94 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in turn, make more detailed
provision for mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but do so broadly, without
indicating how much weight should be assigned to each factor or providing
anything in the manner of concrete sentencing ranges.9 5
Other questions are procedural in nature, yet contain substantive components.
For example, the Statute's so-called "complementary" provisions prohibit the Court
from prosecuting cases that a domestic authority is already "genuinely"
investigating or prosecuting.96 The question of what substantive law states may
apply in these cases and how closely those laws conform to the law of the ICC is
left unresolved.
On some matters, the Rome Statute appears to depart from tribunal case law. For
example, the standard for aiding and abetting appears narrower than that recognized
by the ICTY." The Rome Statute's provisions for command responsibility,
moreover, elaborate upon tribunal case law by imposing a causation requirement
and establishing different elements of superior responsibility for military
commanders and other superiors, respectively.98
In these and other instances, the Court's judges will be required to assess how
much of the prior case law survives the Rome Statute's innovations. Complicating
matters further, the Statute expressly provides that its definitions of offenses shall
not "be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing
rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute." 99 Thus, the
developing case law of the ICC may or may not embody ICL that binds other
courts and tribunals.
Unlike the founding instruments of predecessor tribunals, the Rome Statute does
delineate a framework for how the Court should determine its applicable law.
Although drawing obvious inspiration from the ICJ Statute's Article 38(1), Rome

94. Id. at art. 78(1).
95. International Criminal Court [ICC], Rules of Procedureand Evidence, R. 145, ICC
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 10, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure], available at
http://www.ice-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FIEOACIC-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8BI 15E886/
140164/Rules_ of procedureand Evidence English.pdf.
96. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 17(1)(a).
97. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 25(3)(c) (holding culpable those who
aid or abet the commission of a crime within the court's jurisdiction "[fjor the purpose of
facilitating the commission of such a crime"), with Prosecutor v. Furundfija, Case No. IT95-17/1-T, Judgment, 1 249 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998)
(holding "the legal ingredients of aiding and abetting in international criminal law to be the
following: the actus reus consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime" and that "the mens rea
required is the knowledge that these acts assist the commission of the offence").
98. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 28; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1 423 n.550
(June 15, 2009) ("acknowledg[ing) that the ad hoc tribunals do not recognise causality as an
element of superior responsibility"); Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of NonMilitary Superiors in the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J.INT'L L. 89 (2000).
99. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 10.
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Statute Article 21 presents its sources of law in a strictly hierarchical framework. 00
It requires recourse first to the Court's Statute, 1o' Elements of Crimes,10 2 and Rules
of Procedure.' 03 Second, and "where appropriate," the Court is to consult
"applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict."'4 Finally, failing
disposition by those other sources, the Court may look to general principles of law,
which are here somewhat oddly defined. The Statute describes these as follows:
(G]eneral principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws
of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and
with international law and internationally recognized norms and
standards.o 5
Read literally, this last provision makes little sense. To the extent the
consultation of domestic law is limited to identifying universal "general principles
of law," then the specific "national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime" have no special relevance. Predictably, this infelicitous
phrasing has produced conflicting interpretations. Margaret deGuzman, for
example, reads this provision to retain international law's traditional commitment
to identifying universally applicable general principles.'06 Benjamin Perrin's
interpretation, by contrast, favors something akin to Judge Cassese's "last resort"
approach. hi the event that the traditional sources of law failed, the Court would
look to the specific domestic laws of states that would exercise jurisdiction under
normal circumstances, as determined by the locus of the crime or by other bases of
jurisdiction.107

100. Id. at art. 21(a).
101. Id.
102. International Criminal Court (ICC], Elements of Crimes, ICC Doc. ICCASP/1/3(part 11-B) (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-ABOB-68E5F9082543/0/
Element of CrimesEnglish.pdf.
103. ICC Rules of Procedure, supra note 95.
104. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 21(1)(b).
105. Id. at art. 21(1)(c).
106. See deGuzman, Article 21, supra note 19, at 710.
107. See Perrin, supra note 57, at 400. Perrin concludes that, based on the drafting
history:

Article 21(c) would operate to fill gaps first by considering legal systems (or
traditions) of the world seeking broad consensus. If judges do not find such
agreement, as in Erdemovic, then they would examine the smaller subset of
national laws that would ordinarily apply on the facts of the particular case.
While there could be multiple national laws applicable, in cases of noninternational armed conflicts it is conceivable that only one state would
normally have jurisdiction.
Id.
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II. ICL AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS

My inquiry into the content of ICL necessarily implicates a broader,
foundational question. Why are there ICL offenses in the first instance? This is a
distinct question from related inquiries into either the general justification of
punishment as a social practice, or the more particular justifications for the
establishment of institutions like the ICTY or the ICC to prosecute international
crimes. Rather, it asks why international law should be concerned with the
definition and punishment of certain crimes-and only certain crimes. As a prima
facie matter, one would expect that the answer to this question would have further
implications for the specific content of ICL, including the relationship between
domestic criminal law and ICL.
At the outset, this inquiry faces an initial hurdle in that there is no settled
agreement on the appropriate scope of ICL offenses. Debate persists as to whether
offenses such as terrorism, drug smuggling, slavery, apartheid, human trafficking,
and even piracy (often cited as the oldest ICL offense) should be recognized as
distinct ICL offenses. 08 There are also questions concerning the appropriate scope
of those offenses that are generally acknowledged to form part of ICL.o9 This

108. Despite various international instruments dealing with the criminalization of
terrorism, drug smuggling, slavery, and human trafficking, efforts to establish these offenses
as stand-alone ICL crimes have thus far failed to attract universal acceptance. See RATNER ET
AL., supra note 29, at 114-40. Notwithstanding widespread exercise of universal jurisdiction
by states over the crime of piracy, Antonio Cassese has reasoned that because piracy, in his
view, does not implicate a "community value," it does not rise to the level of a true
international crime. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2008)
(emphasis omitted).
109. The definition of crimes against humanity, in particular, has undergone a dramatic
evolution from its initial codification in the London Charter to its more recent codification in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 29, at
48-81. The Rome Statute definition includes an expanded list of criminal offenses, including
"enforced disappearance of persons" and "the crime of apartheid," and it affirms ICTY and
ICTR in holding that crimes against humanity are defined by a nexus to a "widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population," rather than by a nexus to an armed
conflict. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 7(1); see also Van Schaack, Definition of
Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 51, at 793 n.22, 827 n.191. This definition of the
offense necessarily invites inquiry into how broadly to interpret the required "widespread or
systematic attack." Although the ICC has yet to produce a conviction for crimes against
humanity, its early case law reveals particular disagreement over whether or not the
perpetrators of crimes against humanity must be states or "state-like" actors. Compare
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Kenya, 1 51
(Mar. 31, 2010) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul) (interpreting Rome Statute
requirement that crimes against humanity are "pursuant to state or organizational policy" to
require involvement of an "entity which may act like a State or has quasi-State abilities"),
with id. 1 90 (Majority Opinion) ("Whereas some have argued that only State-like
organizations may qualify, the Chamber opines that the formal nature of a group and the
level of its organization should not be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have
convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the
capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values." (footnote omitted)). For
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history of ICL, moreover, is replete with examples in which conduct once thought
to fall outside ICL is newly identified by a treaty or judicial precedent in order to
trigger international liability. In this way, questions of "ought" and "is" are
intimately connected: judgments about the actual content of ICL depend to some
degree on normative claims about the proper reach of ICL.
Notwithstanding this complication, however, one can identify certain
uncontroversial propositions about the reach of ICL. First, there are core ICL
offenses-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes-that have been
subject to the jurisdiction of multiple international tribunals and that apply to some
spheres of criminal behavior without triggering debate over the outer boundaries of
ICL. Second, the commission of an "ordinary" domestic offense-murder, rape,
assault, larceny, and so forth-does not, on its own, give rise to individual criminal
liability under international law. Standard justifications for ICL do not advocate a
single universal code to regulate all behavior. Instead, debate focuses on how to
define the limited sphere of criminal behavior that international law governs.no
Accordingly, a complete justification of ICL must defend not only the existence of
ICL but also its limits. A justification that satisfies these requirements has obvious
relevance for my thesis, which is concerned precisely with the questions of when
international law should speak on matters of criminal liability and when it should
be silent.
A. The InternationalRelations Dimension of ICL

One possible explanation for the existence of ICL is that it deals with offenses
that are distinctly international in their nature. Whereas most criminal prosecution
is a matter of state sovereignty, certain criminal conduct may be sufficiently
intertwined with relations among states that its regulation becomes a matter of
concern for the international community as a whole. This approach draws support
from the traditional account of international law, which itself rests upon an analogy
between the state and the individual. Whereas national law governs relations
among individuals, each subject to a particular national sovereign, international law
governs relations among states, and it is the states, therefore, which are the true
subjects of this law."'
arguments expanding the notion of crimes against humanity beyond its traditional
application to mass atrocities, see, for example, Doe v. Alvaro Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp.
2d 1112, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2004), ruling that the assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop
constituted a crime against humanity under customary international law. See generally Sonja
B. Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis

Situations, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1257 (2007) (arguing that the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court should be interpreted to apply to systemic human rights
violations untethered to mass atrocity or war).
110. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
111.

See, e.g., JEFFREY DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL

LAW, NoRMs, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 536 (3d ed. 2010) ("In

keeping with the traditional position that intemational law applies only in the relations
between states, the laws of war historically applied only to international armed conflicts.");
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT INTHE AGE OF TERRORISM 44
(2002) [hereinafter FLETCHER, ROMANTICS] ("Traditionally, international law addressed the
behavior of states. The state is a collective reduced to a person, a sovereign, a single entity
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Superficially at least, this account provides some support for the development of
a uniform and autonomous ICL. Indeed, if international affairs are an entirely
separate sphere outside the realm of state sovereignty, then domestic laws may be
thought to have no legitimate influence. Nevertheless, there are at least two
problems with this account that limit its ability to guide the content of ICL.
First, the resort to international relations, without more, risks a formalistic, even
tautological account of ICL. To state that international law applies to international
affairs or state behavior simply begs the question of why international affairs must
be segmented off as a separate sphere of activity subject to separate legal rules in
the first instance. The challenge, then, is to develop a functional account that
connects the international character of a crime to the law governing its punishment.
Proponents of the international-relations approach can readily point to some
ways in which the international character of ICL offenses has consequences for the
law's content. The efficacy of some rules, for example, may depend upon
reciprocal obligations.' 12 In the context of international armed conflict, restrictive
rules of war will leave states at a military disadvantage if other parties to the
conflict do not restrict themselves in the same way. States' willingness to accept
and abide by humane rules of war will therefore depend to some degree on the
willingness of other states to agree to and abide by the same rules."' A focus on
international relations may also serve a negative function by placing limits on the
reach of international law and protecting certain areas of state sovereignty.
Neither of these considerations, however, requires ICL to take the form of a
complete criminal code that comprehensively governs how the rules of war or other
international obligations must be reduced to principles of individual criminal
liability. States might readily agree that the rules of war must be backed by criminal
sanctions while also agreeing that effective enforcement does not hinge on whether
states can resolve their differences over, say, capital punishment. A focus on
deterring war crimes might emphasize effective rules of command responsibility
and nonimmunity for the highest-level perpetrators, while remaining agnostic about
the treatment of others farther down the chain of command. It is perhaps not
surprising, therefore, that the relevant treaties have emphasized the basic rules of
war while remaining generally silent or selective on principles of individual
criminal liability." 4 Only with the advent of actual international tribunals, and in
that can take its place alongside the other sovereigns in the law of nations. As all human
beings are created equal, all states are equal subjects in international law."); RATNER ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 4 ("As defined by the positivist school that dominated the field from the
late eighteenth century, (international law] governed principally relations between states
(and between their sovereigns), with individuals usually at best third-party beneficiaries.").
112. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Laws of War, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 365,
365 (2009) (noting that "the principle of reciprocity has long been foundational to
international law and the law of war specifically").
113. Id. at 366 ("Few would consider practicable a legal regime that required one side to
'fight with one hand tied behind its back' while its enemy exercised free reign."); see also H.
Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operationof the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 206, 212
(1953) ("[l~t is impossible to visualize the conduct of hostilities in which one side would be
bound by rules of warfare without benefiting from them and the other side would benefit
from rules of warfare without being bound by them.").
114. Prior to the London Charter, international treaties establishing the rules of war were
generally silent on matters of individual criminal responsibility. See RATNER ET AL., supra
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particular the ICC, has something resembling a comprehensive criminal law begun

to take shape." 5
Second, and most obvious, is the failure of the international-relations approach
to reflect the breadth of ICL as it has evolved over the last several decades.
Historically speaking, the concern for international relations helps explain ICL's
early focus on war crimes committed by opposing sides against each others'
citizens during international conflicts.' 16 Since World War II, however, ICL has
evolved into a body of law that resists easy distinctions between the international
and the domestic. Today, all but one of the core ICL offenses prosecuted by
international tribunals can apply to crimes committed exclusively within the
territory of a single state, without involvement-as either perpetrators or victimsof the citizens of other states. The law of war crimes has evolved to regulate
internal armed conflicts according to largely the same rules that apply to
international conflicts.' 1 7 The evolution of the more recently established offense of
crimes against humanity has abandoned any mandatory link to an armed conflict,
international or otherwise."' 8 Similarly, the crime of genocide, codified in the 1948
Genocide Convention, has never included such a requirement.' 19 Only the crime of
aggression, requiring an illegal use of force by one state against another, retains a
clearly international component, and, ironically if not surprisingly, it is precisely
this crime that remains the most controversial and elusive to define.1 20
note 29, at 83. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and two Additional Protocols from 1977
all outline various "grave breaches" that constitute war crimes, but do so without providing
detailed elements or standards of criminal liability. See id. at 87-89.
115. See infra Part III.D.
116. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 29, at 101 ("The criminality of acts violating the laws
or customs of war in non-international conflicts has been somewhat obscure until relatively
recently. Although some international law developed to provide minimal levels of
protection, there is little evidence that violations were traditionally regarded as criminal. . . .
[Tihe post-World War 11 prosecutions for war crimes typically involved incidents of a truly
international character.").
117. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 129 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2. 1995) ("[W]e have no doubt that (the war crimes alleged] entail individual criminal
responsibility, regardless of whether they are committed in internal or international armed
conflicts."); see also Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 8(2)(e) (defining war crimes "in
armed conflicts not of an international character").
118. See supra note 109.
119. Genocide Convention, supra note 22, at art. 2 (stating that genocide includes the
commission of an act with "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group").
120. Although the post-World War II International Military Tribunals prosecuted
aggression under the label "crimes against peace," no subsequent tribunal has possessed
jurisdiction over the crime. See generally Bush, supra note 51. After the drafters of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court failed to reach agreement on whether and
how to give the ICC jurisdiction over the crime, they inserted a placeholder into the Statute,
providing that the ICC will "exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime." Rome Statute, supra note 24, at
art. 5(2); see also WILLiAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 26-28 (2001). On June 11, 2010 the ICC's Assembly of States Parties
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The erosion of the traditional model also reveals itself not only in the letter of
the law, but also in the actual enforcement practices of the international
community. The expansion of ICL's substantive reach has coincided with a
proliferation of international criminal tribunals and so-called hybrid tribunals to
prosecute ICL offenses.' 2 1 Although the post-World War II tribunals dealt with a
major international conflict, post-Cold War efforts-including the hybrid
tribunals-have focused on crimes committed predominantly in the context of
internal armed conflicts. Of these, the former Yugoslav conflict was the most
international in its scope, largely by virtue of the fact that a single state,
Yugoslavia, disintegrated into multiple entities. 22 To date, moreover, each of the
five situations that has given rise to formal investigations by the ICC has been
predominantly domestic in nature.m
There are, of course, ways to account for these developments while still
maintaining that ICL crimes exhibit an international character. For example, one
can argue that contemporary ICL simply reflects a more expansive view of the
international sphere, a view that acknowledges the detrimental effects on the
international order of activity that, taken in isolation, may seem purely domestic in
scope. The ICTY Appeals Chamber resorted to precisely this reasoning when it
argued that the impact of civil strife on the economic, political, and ideological
interests of third States favored the extension of international war crimes
prohibitions to noninternational conflicts so as to prevent "spillover effects."1 24
Similar arguments can be made about the types of systematic campaigns of
persecution and extermination that typically give rise to charges of genocide and
crimes against humanity.

adopted an amendment defining the offense and establishing preconditions for the exercise
of ICC jurisdiction over it. See International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties
[ICC-ASP), The Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/8/RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010). The
amendment is currently pending ratification by the States Parties and, by its terms, will not
take effect until 2017 at the earliest. See id. at 4 (art. 15(3) ter). Absent a referral from the
Security Council, the amendment will allow States Parties to opt out by declaring they do not
accept jurisdiction respecting acts of aggression which they have committed. See id. at 3 (art.
15(4) bis).
121. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
122. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITrLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION
(rev. ed. 1997). As detailed above, other tribunals have focused on conflicts in Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, among other places. See supra notes 25, 41 and accompanying
text.
123. ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo has initiated investigations with respect to
alleged ICL offenses committed in the Darfur region of Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Kenya. International Criminal Court,
All Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Cases.
124. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 97 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995) ("[T]he large-scale nature of civil strife, coupled with the increasing
interdependence of States in the world community, has made it more and more difficult for
third States to remain aloof: the economic, political and ideological interests of third States
have brought about direct or indirect involvement of third States in this category of conflict,
thereby requiring that international law take greater account of their legal regime in order to

prevent, as much as possible, adverse spill-over effects.").
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These are important considerations that caution against simplistic distinctions
between the international and domestic spheres. But the point is also fatal to the
traditional model precisely because of the ambiguity it reveals. In a globalized
society, the range of activity that has an impact on international affairs is vast. Just
as students of the United States Constitution know that Congress can describe
almost any activity-in the aggregate-as triggering its right to regulate
"interstate" commerce,
so might any criminal law be defended based on
international interests. For example, traditional crimes of physical violence and
crimes against property all have economic impacts that, in the aggregate, adversely
affect the world economy. To take more concrete examples, personal drug abuse
fuels an international drug trade, and demand for prostitution fuels an international
sex trade. Yet no one seriously argues that common offenses such as larceny,
burglary, assault, murder, drug abuse, or prostitution should, without additional
elements, all be codified as part of ICL.
An expanded view of ICL, moreover, also undermines the notion that
international law must necessarily exercise a monopoly over every aspect of the
codification and enforcement of ICL. If anything, the expanded view reveals that
there is in fact no clear separation between what we term "international affairs" and
what we term "domestic affairs." While international law may have interests in
regulating certain or greater areas of conduct, these interests will inevitably overlap
with the interests of domestic authorities.
Another approach is to pose the domestic analogy in different terms. George
Fletcher, for example, has distinguished international crimes from domestic crimes
based on the ground that all ICL offenses are collective offenses, "deeds that by
their very nature are committed by groups and typically against individuals as
members of groups." 26 This feature, according to Fletcher, reflects continuity with
the traditional view of international law which "addressed the behavior of states,"
the state being a "collective reduced to a person, a sovereign, a single entity that
can take its place alongside the other sovereigns in the law of nations."l27
As I shall elaborate further, the problem of collective criminality does play an
important role in justifying ICL. For present purposes, however, it is enough to
observe that ICL's focus on collective criminality does not by itself supply a moral
justification for the establishment of ICL offenses. While it may be the case that
28
"the crimes of concern to the international community are collective crimes,"'
explaining why that should be so requires more specific justification.
B. The Gravity Dimension ofICL
Discussion of ICL routinely focuses on the fact that ICL is concerned with
crimes of extraordinary gravity. This consideration provides another possible

125. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(The aggregation principle "has no stopping point.[... lne always can draw the circle
broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial
effects on commerce." (alteration in original) (emphasis in original)).
126. FLETCHER, RoMANncs, supra note 111, at 45.
127. Id. at 44.
128. Id. at 45.
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justification of ICL that is perhaps best captured by the concept of "crimes against
humanity." Whereas most crimes may be the concern of primarily a single
community, other especially heinous offenses are by their nature transcendent,
offending all of humanity. In such cases, it becomes the right of the international
community as a whole to prescribe and punish. This, in essence, is the argument
that Hannah Arendt made with respect to the Holocaust, describing it as a "new
crime . .. in the sense of a crime 'against the human status,' or against the very
nature of mankind."I 29 The same or a similar argument is also a common feature of
other scholarly accounts of crimes against humanity and other ICL offenses.3 0
In its basic structure, the argument parallels the international-relations-based
approach to ICL. It is compatible with the Westphalian model of sovereignty in that
it justifies international culpability only for crimes that, in some sense, cross

129.

HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL

268 (rev. ed. t965); see also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE
J. INT'L L. 85, 91 (2004).
130.

See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment,

28

(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996) ("[Crimes against humanity] are
inhumane acts that by their extent and gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to the
international community, which must perforce demand their punishment. But crimes against
humanity also transcend the individual because when the individual is assaulted, humanity
comes under attack and is negated."); LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A
NORMATIVE AccoUNT 80-95 (2005) (advocating an "international harm principle" according
to which crimes against humanity and other ICL offenses require a harm to the international
community as a whole); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ix (2006)
(arguing that crimes against humanity "demean[] every member of the human race");
SCHABAS, supra note 120, at 21 ("The crimes over which the International Criminal Court
has jurisdiction are 'international' not so much because international cooperation is needed
for their repression, although this also true, but because their heinous nature elevates them to
a level where they are of 'concern' to the international community."); Paola Gaeta, The
History and Evolution of the Notion of International Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 175-76 (Roberto
Bellelli ed., 2010) (arguing that an "international crime proper" must be "regarded by the
international community as a whole as a conduct deserving to be criminally sanctioned"); E.

Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 195 (1946) ("A crime
against humanity is an offence against certain general principles of law which, in certain
circumstances, become the concern of the international community, namely, if it has
repercussions reaching across international frontiers, or if it passes 'in magnitude or
savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modern civilizations."'). David Luban has argued
that crimes against humanity are distinct, not merely in that they violate humanness, but in
that they attack humanity in a unique way, namely, by violating our character as "political
animals." Luban, supranote 129, at 91. Under this account, it is critical that these crimes are
perpetrated by states or state-like entities against individuals based on their membership in a
population, thus violating two defining characteristics of the political animal: "individuality"
and "the fact that to be human is to live in groups with other humans." Id. at 116-17. In
addition, the commission of the crimes by states or state-like organizations reveals them to
be "not just horrible crimes; they are horrible political crimes, crimes of politics gone
cancerous." Id. (emphasis in original). In this respect, Luban's argument recalls Fletcher's,
which also emphasizes the importance of state action to ICL offenses. See FLETCHER,
ROMANTICS, supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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borders. Rather than emphasize the physical crossing of borders, however, it
focuses on more abstract harms that become international by offending humanity as
a whole. It is a broader humanism, therefore, that guides the distinction between
national sovereignty and international interest.
Whether or not gravity supplies a complete theory of ICL, at a minimum, this
consideration helps explain the post-World War II evolution of both ICL and
international criminal tribunals. International criminal tribunals have almost
universally focused their efforts on cases of mass atrocity. The Rome Statute in
particular gives pride of place to this mandate when it recalls, in its preamble, the
"millions of children, women and men [that] have been victims of unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity," and affirms "that the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished."' 3 The Statute goes even further by demanding that all otherwise
admissible crimes within the Court's jurisdiction must be of "sufficient gravity to
justify further action by the Court." 3 2
Of the core ICL offenses, both genocide and crimes against humanity are almost
by definition crimes of mass atrocity.133 War crimes and aggression present a
somewhat more complex picture, as the former may more readily be committed as
isolated acts,13 4 whereas the latter focuses on breaches of state sovereignty instead
of offenses against the person.135 Nonetheless, one can safely say at least that,

131. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at pmbl.
132. Id. at art. 17(1)(d). The question of how exactly to interpret this requirement has
itself become the subject of academic debate. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, SituationalGravity
Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1270369; Margaret M. deGuzman,
Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1400 (2009) [hereinafter deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the ICC).
133. The point is clearest with respect to crimes against humanity which, by definition,
involve "widespread or systematic" criminality. Of course, the outer boundaries of this
requirement are debatable. See supra note 109. Although the definition of genocide does not
explicitly require collective or systematic criminality, the crime's focus on preventing the
destruction of entire groups necessarily associates the crime with collective criminality. See,
e.g., VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 30, at 479 (noting that a single person "would rarely
be capable of destroying an entire group, or even a significant part of a group," and querying
whether "such an individual [should] still be found guilty of genocide where his intended
outcome was impossible to achieve").
134. Criminal liability for war crimes does not hinge upon the criminal act forming part
of a larger or systematic pattern of behavior. See infra note 158-59.

135. For example, the London Charter defined aggression, or "Crimes Against Peace" as
the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." London Charter, supra note 50,
at art. 6(a). The Assembly of States Parties of the ICC recently adopted a proposed
amendment to the Rome Statute that defines the crime of aggression by reference to
specified "actfs] of aggression," all of which involve actions of a state taken against another
state. See Int'l Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties [ICC-ASP], The Crime of
Aggression, ICC-ASP/8/RCIRes.6 (June 11, 2010),
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historically speaking, both categories have been associated with great losses to
human life that may be sufficient to trigger gravity-based concerns.'36
In some respects, the gravity of ICL offenses has clear relevance for the content
of the law. By proscribing heinous offenses, ICL denies legal effect to domestic
law that might legalize the prohibited behavior. Those who commit war crimes,
genocide, or crimes against humanity may not claim innocence based on the fact
that their government has, for example, adopted a Fuhrerprinzip,37 absolving all
who act in conformity with the head-of-state's directives. The gravity of these
offenses is such that states should not have discretion to decriminalize them.
Establishing distinct ICL offenses for heinous crimes can also ensure that the law
affords these crimes their appropriate legal characterization. In particular, by
defining an offense as a crime against humanity or as genocide, rather than simply
murder, ICL supplies a vocabulary that gives voice to the special gravity of the
offense.'3 8 Thus, ICL may also demand that such offenses be prosecuted as crimes
against humanity or genocide where the underlying conduct justifies this
characterization. In both of these examples, the gravity of the conduct has direct
implications for the content of ICL.
Notwithstanding their significant explanatory power, however, considerations
of gravity provide problematic and incomplete guidance regarding the content and
scope of ICL. The invocation of gravity is not a talisman that automatically
eradicates legitimate differences between states' approaches to criminal law. States
might agree on the gravity of an offense while disagreeing on whether conspiracy is
an appropriate mode of criminal liability. They might agree on a gravity-based
hierarchy of offenses while disagreeing on what the appropriate sentence is for the
most serious crimes. They might even disagree on the general goals of punishment,
including the appropriate balance of retributive and utilitarian considerations. The
gravity of the offense, in other words, does not dictate the answer to every question
that must be answered in order to punish the offense.
Equally problematic is the fact that gravity-based considerations do not supply a
ready framework for identifying the limits of ICL. Why, for example, should
international law be concerned with genocide but not with "ordinary" murders? The

136. See, e.g, CASSESE, supra note 108, at 29 (emphasizing "[tihe exceptional character
of war (a pathological occurrence in international dealings, leading to utterly inhuman
behavior)" as a historical justification for the imposition of individual criminal responsibility
for war crimes). Note, moreover, that the Rome Statute expresses a preference for ICC
jurisdiction over war crimes committed "as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes." Rome Statute, supranote 24, at art. 8(1).
137. See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, The White Rose: Judges and Justices in the Third
Reich, 15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 95, 114 (2000) (noting that, in Nazi Germany, "the
Fuhrerprinzip,or leadership principle, required judges to adhere to the Fuhrer's policies and
programs").
138. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-ARI Ibis, Decision on Rule
17 (Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda Aug. 30, 2006) (distinguishing
Il bis Appeal,
genocide from homicide on the ground that "the protected legal values are different" because
the "penalization of genocide protects specifically defined groups, whereas the penalization
of homicide protects individual lives").
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question may seem absurd, but there are at least two considerations that deserve
further exploration.
In the first place, the fact that ICL is concerned with especially grave offenses
does not mean that the actual perpetrators of ICL offenses necessarily reflect
greater individual culpability than perpetrators of non-ICL crimes." 9 The point is
perhaps clearest with respect to war crimes, given that war itself is not always
illegal, and that criminal liability does not in any event hinge upon the legality of
the war itself. Accordingly, is a murder committed by a combatant during war
necessarily a more serious offense than a murder committed outside the context of
armed conflict? What about nonhomicidal war crimes?
Crimes against humanity and genocide present somewhat more complex
examples because the perpetration of either involves additional mental elements
that aggravate the offense: the perpetrator of a crime against humanity must have
knowledge of his participation in a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population,140 while genocide requires an intent to destroy a protected
group in whole or in part.'4 1 Even here, however, the situation is not so simple. The
success of mass atrocity typically hinges upon the organizers' ability to mobilize
large numbers of perpetrators whose individual participation reflects varying
degrees of commitment and contribution to the overall crime. Indeed, the unique
social pressures of state-sanctioned violence are such that some scholars have
argued that crimes committed as part of mass atrocities may sometimes reflect less
personal culpability than might otherwise be ascribed.142 The Erdemovid case
presents an extreme case-in-point. Even if one believes that Erdemovi6 should be
punished for having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, the
mitigating factor of his having acted under duress supports the conclusion that he
acted with less personal culpability than, for example, a murderer who kills with
great cruelty and malice but, in doing so, violates only domestic law. From a
gravity-based perspective, it is not obvious why Erdemovi6's deeds belong in the
province of ICL, while the actions of more culpable offenders do not.
Second, even if one accepts that ICL regulates the most serious offenses, that
acceptance does not explain why ICL should not also regulate other serious
offenses that may not rise to the same gravity level. The humanistic impulse that
recoils at the gravest atrocities is not indifferent to victimization that occurs in other
contexts. Acts like murder, rape, kidnapping, and severe physical assaults all
involve grave infractions upon individual autonomy and welfare. Are not such acts
also "crimes against humanity" in the sense that, to quote Arendt, they offend "the
human status"? 43 Should not international law reflect a concern for these offenses,
even when committed in their everyday setting?4

139. See, e.g., deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the ICC, supra note 132, at
1407 (observing that "[i]nternational crimes will not always be more serious than domestic
crimes").
140. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 7(1).

141. See, e.g., id. at art. 6.
142. See DRUMBL, supra note 26, at 32; RUTI G.

TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

50

(2000).
143. ARENDT, supra note 129, at 268.
144. On this point, Luban acknowledges that a broader humanism may justify any
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As it happens, internationallaw has at least a partial answer to this question: the
law does, to some extent, regulate the punishment of offenses outside the category
of crimes commonly described as belonging to ICL. The evolution of human rights
obligations over the last century, and especially since World War II, embraces
precisely the sort of humanism that I have just described-one that rejects
parochialism where fundamental liberties are at stake, and which deprives states of
unchecked sovereignty with respect to how they treat even their own citizens
within their own borders.14 5 Although it is common to distinguish human rights law
from ICL by virtue of the fact that human rights law traditionally regulates states
rather than individuals and does not impose direct criminal liability, it would
nevertheless be wrong to suppose that human rights law has no implications for
substantive criminal law.
Consider the hypothetical scenario of a state, ruled perhaps by a psychotic
dictator, that repeals its criminal code and decriminalizes all human behavior. Does
the repeal violate international law? Surely it does. It violates basic human rights
such as the right to life, liberty, and security.'4" Although the criminal law is, of
course, not the exclusive means by which states can or should protect these rights,
any serious account of human rights law must require criminalization of the core
offenses against persons and property, such as murder, assault, rape, theft, and so
forth.147 A system solely consisting of civil sanctions, without threat of traditional
criminal punishment, could hardly prove adequate. In this way, we can see in
human rights law itself the basic requirements of a criminal code.
This insight is significant for several reasons. First, it complicates the gravitybased theory of ICL by showing that international law already does take positions
on matters of "ordinary" crimes that, however serious, are not thought to pass the
ICL threshold. In addition, it shows that international law may regulate these
activities without dictating every aspect of the criminal law. Although the precise
boundaries may be unclear and subject to debate, international law imposes some
criminal law obligations on states while leaving others to the discretion of each
number of human rights obligations beyond the interests protected by crimes against
humanity. He discounts the relevance of such efforts, however, by arguing that human rights
obligations are largely unenforceable. See generally Luban, supra note 129. Of course, one
can level a similar charge against ICL itself, given the highly selective history of its
enforcement.

145. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 8, 1948) [hereinafter UDHRJ; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

146. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 145, at art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of person."); ICCPR, supra note 145, at arts. 6, 9 (right to life and rights of
liberty and security of person).
147. An instructive example of the same logic can be found in the European Court of
Human Rights' decision in Case of MC. v. Bulgaria, which found inadequate Bulgaria's
rape law, holding inter alia that "[sItates have a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and
8 of the [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] to
enact criminal-law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice
153 (2003),
through effective investigation and prosecution." App. No. 39272/98,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng. The Court implied this obligation from a treaty
provision asserting a right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, see
id. 110, and from another securing a right to privacy, see id.
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legal system. Finally, it reveals that the true challenge of the gravity theory is not to
explain why international law is concerned only with certain limited offenses-that
assumption, again, is misplaced-but instead, to explain why international law
should regulate those offenses in particular ways, for example, by identifying
discrete international crimes and specifying the elements of those crimes.
To answer this last question, it is not enough simply to point to the gravity of
ICL offenses. Instead, one must take account of the practical consequences
involved in ICL's definition of an international crime.
C The Enforcement Theory of ICL
It is with that consideration in mind that I turn to what I call the enforcement
theory of ICL. This account emphasizes the jurisdictional consequences of
establishing ICL offenses. The development of ICL, after all, has not consisted
solely in the definition of offenses. It has served to justify unique forms of
international jurisdiction. International criminal tribunals have prosecuted ICL
offenses. Domestic legal systems recognizing the principle of universal jurisdiction
have invoked ICL to prosecute offenses that otherwise would fall outside the
jurisdiction of their courtS.148 And states that do have a traditional basis of
jurisdiction may invoke criminality under ICL in order to override domestic laws
preventing prosecution. 4 9
What relevance do these jurisdictional consequences have for a theory of ICL?
As a general matter, ICL offenses focus on contexts in which there are special
concerns about state willingness and ability to punish wrongdoers. According to the
enforcement theory, it is these concerns that dictate the content of ICL with a view
toward securing additional bases ofjurisdiction.
1. ICL's Enforcement Principle
Although enforcement considerations explicitly figure in some scholarly
accounts of ICL, their precise significance remains a source of debate. Larry May,
for example, incorporates a "security principle" into his account of crimes against
humanity.o50 Focusing on the systematic nature of these crimes, he justifies

148. See supratext accompanying note 48.
149. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 29, at 25 ("[N]ullem crimen does not serve to
exculpate all those who committed atrocities under the color of the law or rules in effect at
that time. In other words, the promulgation of new rules by a regime violating human rights
does not change the international law or criminality of the offenses."). For example, a 2005
decision of Argentina's Supreme Court relied on international law to deny effect to amnesty
laws purporting to shield military officers from prosecution for serious human rights
violations. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n (CSJN] (National Supreme Court of
Justice], 14/6/2005, "Sim6n, Julio Hdctor," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema
(Arg.), available at
[Fallos] (2005-328-2056)
de Justicia de la Naci6n
http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdfl3560.pdf For a summary of this decision and related
cases, see generally Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of CriminalJustice in
TransitionalJustice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 915 (2009).
150. MAY, supra note 130, at 63-79.
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international criminal liability on the grounds that a state sacrifices its sovereign
authority over criminal law when it "deprives its subjects of physical security or
subsistence, or is unable or unwilling to protect its subjects from harms to security
or subsistence."s'5 For May, however, this enforcement-based concern is necessary
but not sufficient for the establishment of ICL. ICL crimes must also, in his view,
satisfy an "international harm principle" of the sort that Hannah Arendt has
advanced.152
Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, by contrast, have developed
an account that relies solely on the security principle and dispenses with the search
for distinctly international harms. They limit their model to "widespread or
systematic" crimes, however, in order to ensure that international intervention is
limited to cases in which a state's response to criminality "falls below what can be
reasonably demanded."' Critically, the authors would extend ICL to a broader
range of situations than it presently encompasses. Although they derive the phrase
"widespread or systematic" from the Rome Statute's definition of crimes against
humanity,154 they would include cases where failed states have resulted in
widespread criminality that does not take the form of a coordinated attack on a
civilian population.' 55 They further defend this requirement as a general restraint on
international adjudicative intervention rather than as an element of any particular
crime. 56
Between these two poles, there is a middle position that I believe better accounts
for the core ICL offenses in their present state of evolution. Although ICL need not
hinge its fate on the elusive quest for distinctly international harms, its limited
scope reflects a security principle that is built into the definitions of each of its
offenses. Specifically, ICL is concerned with offenses whose very commission is
associated with failures of domestic sovereignty, either because of state inability to
prosecute or because of illegitimate state reluctance to prosecute. The very
commission of an ICL offense, therefore, justifies heightened concerns that the
standard bases of domestic jurisdiction are inadequate and that additional
international bases ofjurisdiction are appropriate. 51

151. Id. at 68.
152. Id. at 80-95; see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
153. Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, A Defense of International
Criminal Law, 115 ETuics 35, 49 (2004).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 7(1).
155. Altman & Wellman, supra note 153, at 48-49. More specifically, the authors reject

the Rome Statute's requirement of an "attack" on a civilian population, id. at 50, which the
treaty further defines as a course of conduct "in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack," Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 7(2)(a).
156. Altman & Wellman, supra note 153, at 49.
157. M. Cherif Bassiouni adopts a similar rationale in developing his theory of crimes
against humanity. Bassiouni argues that crimes against humanity require an "international

element," which he defines as the existence of a "state action or policy" underlying the
offense. M. CHERIF BASSIOUN1, CRIMEs AGAINsT HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 247 (1992). According to Bassiouni, "[i]mplicit in the notion of 'state action or policy'
as the international element, is the realization that national legal systems are frequently
incapable of reaching certain persons who, by virtue of their position, are beyond the reach
of the law. Thus, there is a necessity for international crininalization ..... Id. My account is
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A key advantage of this account is that it provides a principled and functional
basis for a limited ICL while simultaneously identifying a common thread among
established ICL offenses. It explains, for example, the focus on systematic crimes
that often, but not always, reflect official state policy. Where state policy guides the
commission of atrocities, the enforcement challenge is obvious: the state's
involvement casts immediate doubt on the state's willingness to pursue justice in
good faith. It also explains the extension of war crimes law to internal armed
conflicts, as well as the extension of crimes against humanity to widespread or
systematic attacks that are committed pursuant to a nonstate organizational policy.
The very existence of an armed conflict within a state, or of an organization's
ability to conduct such attacks, is associated with extraordinary state inability to
enforce its criminal law against the wrongdoers, most likely because the state has
lost effective control over portions of its territory. In such cases, unwillingness or
inability to prosecute presumptively reflects an acute enforcement failure that
cannot be ascribed to the general leeway that states rightfully enjoy over the
allocation of scarce resources and the balance of conflicting priorities.
Of the core ICL offenses historically prosecuted by international tribunals, only
war crimes appear to be a partial standout on the grounds that belligerents can
commit war crimes as isolated acts, and there is no reason to presume that states
otherwise committed to uphold the law of war will not enforce the law under those
circumstances.' 58 This may be the exception that proves the rule, however. The
Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes "in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes."l 5 9 Thus, even though the customary definition of war crimes may be
broader than required by the enforcement theory of ICL, actual judicial intervention
by the international community is most likely to focus on the subset of offenses that
better fit the theory.
The enforcement theory of ICL gains even greater currency when considered in
light of other developments critical to the ongoing evolution of ICL. In particular, it
finds a ready procedural parallel in the Rome Statute's system of complementary
jurisdiction that situates the ICC as a court of last resort, authorized to proceed only
when the state that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the offense has
proven "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution."' 60 The enforcement theory reveals that the ICC in fact embraces a
system of double complementarity. There is an initial layer of complementarity
embedded in the substantive law itself, which, as I have just outlined, focuses on
crimes that are most associated with domestic prosecutorial failure. The Rome
Statute then adds a second, procedural layer of complementarity designed to ensure
more permissive, however, in that it recognizes that similar enforcement-based concerns
may be triggered by crimes that are not themselves the product of state action or policy.
158. For a criminal offense to qualify as a war crime, it must be closely related to an
armed conflict. See Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, T 14 (May
26, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement,
T 185-89 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT 96-23/1-A,
Judgement, $$ 82-84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). There is,
however, no requirement that the offense form part of a broader pattern of criminal behavior.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 8(1).
160. Id at art. 17(1)(a).
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that the presumptive failure to prosecute has been confirmed by an actual failure to
prosecute. Taken together, this system of double complementarity reflects a strong
preference for domestic prosecution and positions ICL firmly as a law of last
resort. 6'
None of this is to say that the enforcement theory is a perfect or airtight theory
of ICL. Like other approaches to ICL, it has its complications. Where exactly does
one draw the line between offenses that trigger special enforcement concerns and
those that do not? Under any version, for instance, the enforcement theory must
impose some gravity threshold, as the international community is unlikely to
commit its own limited resources to support ICL status for offenses that are not

161. Although the concept of complementarity is most closely associated with the ICC,
related ideas have found expression in other contexts as well. Some have maintained, for
example, that states exercising universal domestic jurisdiction over international crimes owe
some deference to domestic courts possessing a more traditional basis of jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (noting, for purposes of
recognizing universal civil jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute,
the European Commission's argument that "before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the
claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and
perhaps in other forums [sic] such as international claims tribunals"); Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3, 80 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of
Judges Higgins, Koojimans, and Buergenthal) ("A State contemplating bringing criminal
charges based on universal jurisdiction must first offer to the national State of the
prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned."). In
addition, both the Institut De Droit International and the Princeton Project on Universal
Jurisdiction have endorsed frameworks for universal jurisdiction that would give
prosecutorial priority to states enjoying a traditional basis of jurisdiction over the crime in
question. See Institute of International Law, Resolution, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with
Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes (Aug. 25,
2005), availableat http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005 kra_03_en.pdf ("Any State
having custody over an alleged offender should, before commencing a trial on the basis of
universal jurisdiction, ask the State where the crime was committed or the State of
nationality of the person concerned whether it is prepared to prosecute that person, unless
these States are manifestly unwilling or unable to do so. . . . Any State having custody over
an alleged offender, to the extent that it relies solely on universal jurisdiction, should
carefully consider and, as appropriate, grant any extradition request addressed to it by a State
having a significant link, such as primarily territoriality or nationality, with the crime, the
offender, or the victim, provided such State is clearly able and willing to prosecute the
alleged offender."); Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction,in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 18, 23 (Stephen Macedo
ed., 2003) (providing, in Principle 8, a multi-factor test for "Resolution of Competing
Jurisdictions"); see also Florian Jessberger, Universal Jurisdiction, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 555, 556 ("From a legal
policy perspective the exercise of universal jurisdiction may be warranted because, as
regards the prosecution of these heinous crimes against international law, the state of
commission often is either unable or unwilling to prosecute the offenders."). For a broader
discussion of different concepts of complementarity in international criminal law, see
MOHAMED M. EL ZEtDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY ININTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE (2008).
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perceived to be among the gravest. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to
explore every nuance of the enforcement approach; it is enough to establish that
enforcement considerations are central to the present evolution of ICL.
2. Implications for Applicable Law
Although providing perhaps the most complete account of ICL, the enforcement
theory also provides the weakest support for developing ICL as a uniform and
complete code of universally mandatory criminal law. The underlying assumption
is that ICL would not be needed absent special concerns over state willingness and
ability to acknowledge and prosecute the offenses in question. In the event that a
state can rebut the presumption of bad faith and can demonstrate a good faith
commitment to justice, the enforcement theory has difficulty explaining why that
state should not have the leeway to apply its own principles of criminal law to ICL
offenses.
One may object that I have elided a central problem-that the application of a
uniform, internationally agreed-upon ICL is necessary precisely as the means by
which a state can rebut the presumption of non-enforcement and evidence its
commitment to justice. This objection reaches too far, however. While applying
international law may be one means of demonstrating good faith, it is not the only
means. A state could also demonstrate good faith by treating ICL offenses in a
manner consistent with its general treatment of domestic offenses. To return to a
previous example, 62 ICL may rightly deny Germany the right to apply a
Fuhrerprinzip where ICL offenses are concerned. That point leaves open the
possibility, however, that the regular German criminal law might still provide an
appropriate mechanism for prosecuting ICL offenses in the event the Fuhrerprinzip
is not applied, at least so far as that law adequately acknowledges the gravity of the
offenses and does not run afoul of human rights obligations.16 3
This logic suggests most obviously that domestic courts should be afforded
some discretion to apply their own legal principles when prosecuting ICL offenses.
It also has implications for international tribunals, however. The double
complementarity paradigm reveals that international tribunals exercise a form of
surrogate jurisdiction: they exist to prosecute crimes that, in ideal circumstances, a
domestic court would be prosecuting. This relationship supplies a powerful
argument that when international tribunals do assert jurisdiction, they should
respect the legal principles that the domestic court would have applied had it taken
jurisdiction over the case. One analogue in U.S. law is the application of state law
by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction in disputes involving parties from
different U.S. states.'6 A related principle also reveals itself in the international
human rights jurisprudence, which upholds both the principle of subsidiarity

162. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
163, 1 put aside for these purposes the problem of whether German law would need to
employ the same labels as ICL, for example by prosecuting genocide as genocide rather than
as multiple counts of murder. See infra note 272 and accompanying text. The potential
relevance of domestic law principles is of course broader than that particular question.
164. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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(favoring resolution of disputes at lower levels of governmental authority)s65 and
the doctrine of margin of appreciation (affording states latitude over the
interpretation of human rights obligations, especially where the international
obligation is uncertain or in transition). Another example, also in international
law, is the traditional law of occupation, which imposes an obligation upon
occupying powers, where possible, to restore and respect the existing laws of the
Although international tribunals do not physically occupy
occupied territory.
territory, the concept of complementarity indicates a kind of occupying jurisdiction
by which international tribunals temporarily usurp the jurisdiction that domestic
courts are otherwise expected to exercise.
III. RULE OF LAW VALUES
With the standard justifications of ICL failing to assist, defenders of a uniform
ICL must look elsewhere. Another set of arguments center on what I generally refer
to as "rule of law" considerations. The idea here is that ICL's very existence as a
separate body of law may require doctrinal uniformity even if the specific
rationales for the creation of ICL do not do so directly.
A. The Consistency Principle
Undoubtedly the most common argument for developing ICL as a uniform,
internally comprehensive body of law has focused on the inherent value of
consistency in the law. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber has observed with respect to
its sentencing practice:
One of the fundamental elements in any rational and fair system of
criminal justice is consistency in punishment. This is an important
reflection of the notion of equal justice. The experience of many
domestic jurisdictions over the years has been that . . . public
confidence may be eroded if these institutions give an appearance of
injustice by permitting substantial inconsistencies in the punishment of
different offenders, where the circumstances of the different offences
and of the offenders being punished are sufficiently similar that the
punishments imposed would, in justice, be expected to be also
generally similar. 68
Although the Court was focused specifically on sentencing, its reasoning has
broader applications, and others have invoked similar arguments with respect to the
content of ICL as a whole' 69 If principles of justice and equality require that like
cases are treated alike, ICL should strive for consistency and uniformity, even in

165. See Berman, supra note 23, at 1209-11.
166. See id. at 1201-03.
167. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (1910).
168. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement,
the Former Yugoslovia Feb. 20, 2001).
169. See supra note 19.

1 756 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
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instances where the underlying purposes of ICL may not otherwise dictate a
particular doctrinal result.
Consistency in the law is undoubtedly an important value, but the argument only
goes so far. Broad-based arguments for consistency in international criminal law
necessarily treat ICL offenses as a closed universe in which perpetrators of
international crimes are compared only with other perpetrators of international
crimes. They ignore the fact that the establishment of ICL offenses necessarily
creates or perpetuates inconsistency so long as the international community
embraces the system of state sovereignty in which domestic legal systems enjoy
discretion to develop and apply their own principles of criminal law.
Perhaps the most famous example of this tension involves Rwanda's
relationship with the ICTR. When the U.N. Security Council voted in 1994 to
establish the tribunal, Rwanda's delegate to the Council voted against the measure,
in part because defendants convicted by the ICTR would not face the death
penalty. 7 1 At the time, Rwanda recognized the death penalty both for international
crimes,1' and for other serious offenses under domestic law., 72 The result was that
the high-level offenders tried by the ICTR could secure more lenient treatment than
could lower-level participants facing domestic trials, as well as non-genocidal
perpetrators of murder and serious offenses. One might justify the ICTR's
exclusion of the death penalty on moral or other grounds, but the basic point does
not depend on one's views about the death penalty. A principled concern for
consistency and equal treatment cannot treat ICL offenses or international tribunals
as a closed universe concerned only with internal consistency.
Reflection on these matters reveals that the introduction of distinct ICL offenses
against the backdrop of transnational pluralism in the criminal law necessarily leads
to one of three kinds of inconsistencies:

170. See ICTR Statute, supra note 42, at art. 23(1) ("The penalty imposed by the Trial
Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment."); U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 16,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994). See generally Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of
ConcurrentJurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 356-57
(1997) (noting Rwanda's objection that "[t]he leaders of the genocide, tried before the
International Tribunal, would escape the death penalty while lower level perpetrators, tried
in Rwanda national courts, might be executed").
171. See Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions
for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed
Since
October
1,
1990,
Art.
14
(Rwanda),
available
at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm.
172. See Republic of Rwanda Dcret-Loi No. 21/77, Code P6nal art. 26, 1 Codes et Lois
du Rwanda 391 (1995), Universit6 Nationale du Rwanda Facult6 de Droit (Fr.). In 2007,
Rwanda repealed its death penalty, largely so that as to facilitate the transfer of suspects to
Rwandan courts. See Organic Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, art. 3 (Rwanda) (relating to
the Abolition of the Death Penalty) ("In all legislative texts in force before the
commencement of this Organic Law, the death penalty is substituted by life imprisonment or
life imprisonment with special provisions as provided for by this Organic Law."); Aimable
Twabira, "Rwanda to Scrap Death Penalty in Hunt for Genocide Suspects," Inter Press
Service, Sept. 4, 2006, available at http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Rwanda-4-Sep06-Rwanda to ScrapDeathPenalty in Hunt forGenocide Suspects.pdf.
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1. Both international and domestic courts prosecuting ICL offenses
apply a single uniform ICL, producing nonculpability-driven
inconsistencies in the treatment of ICL offenders versus domestic law
offenders.
2. International tribunals apply a uniform ICL while domestic courts
integrate domestic law principles into ICL prosecutions, producing
inconsistency in the treatment of ICL offenders based on which court
prosecutes the offense.
3. Both international tribunals and domestic courts integrate
domestic law principles into ICL prosecutions, perpetuating existing
inconsistencies among different domestic legal systems.
These three options are not mutually exclusive, and in combination they yield
even more alternatives. A domestic court might, for example, apply a uniform ICL
at the conviction stage while applying its own sentencing law post-conviction.
International tribunals, moreover, can apply different versions of ICL, as
evidenced, for example, by the ICTY's adoption of legal positions inconsistent with
the ICC's Statute.""
In short, then, the establishment of JCL as a separate but limited body of
criminal law necessarily perpetuates some inconsistency in the criminal law. The
question is not how to eliminate inconsistency, but which form of consistency to
privilege. While the purposes of ICL, as I have already explored, necessarily
require some obligations that override inconsistent domestic laws, there are also
powerful arguments for emphasizing domestic uniformity over international
uniformity with respect to general questions of criminal law for which the purposes
of ICL do not dictate a single result.
There is, in the first place, international law's general presumption in favor of
state sovereignty, which gives states broad latitude with respect to governing their
territory and population. This principle reveals itself, among other places, in the
human rights context. The European Court of Human Rights has defended
extending a "margin of appreciation" to national authorities in cases where
international consensus on contested matters of public morals is lacking, and where
national authorities are therefore "[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact
with the vital forces of their countries, . . . in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements."' 7 4

173. To take one example, the ICC Elements of Crimes limits genocide prosecutions to
cases of criminal conduct where "[t~he conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect
such destruction." Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court, arts. 6(a)(4), (b)(4), (c)(5), (d)(5), (e)(7), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (2000). The ICTY Appeals Chamber has expressly rejected this
limitation on the law of genocide. See Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A,

Judgement, $ 224 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. t9, 2004).
174. Handyside v. United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, T 48; see also George
Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin ofAppreciation, 26 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 72429 (2006). Letsas distinguishes this "structural" concept of the margin of appreciation from a
separate "substantive" concept of the doctrine that addresses "the relationship between
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In the context of ICL, an analogous deference to national authorities reveals
itself in the limited scope of ICL offenses and in the evolving complementarity
principle that gives procedural priority to domestic courts. "' The goals of
international criminal trials, moreover, have commonly paid special attention to the
interests of the societies most affected by international crimes. The creators and
advocates of international tribunals have justified ICL prosecutions on the grounds
that criminal justice will foster peace, reconciliation, and political transition in
atrocity-marked societies.' 7 6 The establishment of hybrid tribunals has further
emphasized the need to domesticate ICL prosecutions by locating trials on the
territory of these societies, extending jurisdiction over domestic offenses alongside
international offenses, and integrating local prosecutors and judges into the
process.' 7 7 Although integration of domestic law into ICL prosecutions cannot by
itself ensure the efficacy and perceived legitimacy of international tribunals, it
represents another step in that direction. 7 8
I explore additional advantages of domestic law in the reminder of the Article.
B. The Legality Principle

Another rule of law value to claim a stake in this debate is the legality principle,
which demands clarity in the law and prohibits both retroactive punishment for
actions not criminal at the time of their offense, and the imposition of punishment
beyond what was legally authorized for the offense at the time of its commission.
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege has received

increasing recognition, not merely as a principle of justice,17 9 but as an established
and binding rule of international law enshrined in the Rome Statute, among other
places.1 s0
individual freedoms and collective goals." Id. at 706.
175. See supra notes 24-26, 108-10 and accompanying text.
176. See generally Greenawalt,Justice, supra note 27, at 601-05.

177. See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 25; ECCC Statute, supra note 25. See generally
Turner, supra note 26.
178. Mirjan Damasksa comes close to endorsing a pluralistic conception of ICL based on
this rationale. See Mirjan Damatka, What Is the Pointof InternationalCriminalJustice?, 83

L. REv. 329, 349 (2008) ("Ideally then, international criminal justice would
appear in various local garbs. In order to command 'thick acceptance,' it would be adapted
to local legal culture, the contours of communal experience, and local moral sensibilities.").
He rejects this approach, however, on the grounds that it would "entail fragmentation of
international criminal law: the multiplicity of its variations would be difficult to order in
ways capable of preserving the system's coherence." Id. Damaska therefore argues that local
variation is better addressed through exercises of prosecutorial discretion and through
judicial decisions that "make it their habit always to explain . . . the reasons or special needs
that induce international criminal law to deviate from whatever local norms or practices are
deemed fair and appropriate." Id
CHI.-KENT

179. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM.

J. INT'L L. 172, 217 (1947) ("[lGt is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is
not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle ofjustice." (italics in original)).
180, Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 22(1) ("A person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."); see also International Covenant on
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At the most obvious level, anti-retroactivity concerns provide a strong argument
in favor of applying applicable domestic law, considering in particular ICL's
checkered history with the principle of legality. Where pre-established principles
of international law do not resolve a legal question arising in an international
criminal trial, the court could instead resort to established domestic law principles
to avoid retroactive punishment. This, in essence, is the "last resort" approach that
Judge Cassese advanced in his Erdemovid dissent: if the majority was correct that
international law was heretofore silent on whether duress could serve as a complete
defense to murder, then it should have relied on applicable domestic law to avoid
retroactive punishment.18 2 The Rome Statute's Article 21 reference to domestic law
arguably adopts this approach, 8 3 as do, in a more limited fashion, the penalty
provisions of the ICTR and ICTY statutes. 184
The implications of this argument are limited, however, as there is nothing in the
concern for legality that asserts a substantive preference for the integration of local
law. Rather, domestic law is relevant only as a gap filler, and perhaps a temporary
one at that. The "last resort" argument favors the temporary use of domestic law
without prejudice to the evolution of a more comprehensive body of ICL that
equally satisfies legality requirements. Indeed, one might argue that uniformity
better promotes legality because it provides clarity, which eliminates doubts over
which body of law (uniform ICL, domestic law, or perhaps one of several
competing domestic laws) controls a particular question. From this perspective,
even judicial decisions that retroactively announce new ICL standards may be said
to promote the long-term interest of legality by contributing to the development of
a consistent and clear body of ICL, even as such precedents entail some sacrifice of
legality in the short term.
Although this argument has some force, several considerations moderate
legality-based concerns against the application of domestic law. First, most ICL
offenses involve activity that is also a crime under domestic law.' 5 Thus, the
perpetrator of genocide or crimes against humanity already faces the prospect of
being subject to multiple, possibly conflicting, bodies of law to the extent that one
Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 1.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
181. See supra PartL.B.

182. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cassese, j 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslovia Oct. 7, 1997) ("Were ex
hypothesi international criminal law really ambiguous on duress or were it even to contain a
gap, it would therefore be appropriate and judicious to have recourse-as a last resort-to
the national legislation of the accused, rather than to moral considerations or policy-oriented
principles." (emphasis in original)).
183. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 2 1(1)(c); see also supra notes 99-106 and
accompanying text.
184. See ICTR Statute, supra note 42, at art. 23(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at art.
24(1).
185. For example, one who murders in violation of domestic law may also be guilty of a
war crime, a crime against humanity, or genocide depending on whether, as the case may be,

the crime took place in the context of an armed conflict, the perpetrator acted in knowing
furtherance of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, or acted with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. See Rome
Statute, supranote 24, at arts. 6-8.

2011]

THE PLURALISM OFINTERNATIONAL CRIAHNAL LAW

1105

or more domestic courts (or a hybrid tribunal enjoying jurisdiction over domestic
offenses) asserts jurisdiction. Thus, uniformity at the ICL level will, on balance,
increase rather than decrease the pluralism of applicable domestic laws.
Second, to the extent that anti-retroactivity norms are driven by concerns about
fair warning to the accused,'86 this consideration is less powerful with respect to
perpetrators who have engaged in mass atrocities of the kind that ICL has often
confronted. The manifestly wrongful nature of the conduct has provided a powerful
justification for the perpetrators' punishment, irrespective of whether applicable
domestic or international law explicitly criminalized the conduct at the time of its
commission. On account of these considerations, the legality case law of the ICTY
and ICTR has generally emphasized the foreseeability of punishment over a purely
positive law account of non-retroactivity.1 17
One can object that the tribunals' focus on fair warning does disservice to other
standard justifications underlying the legality principle, specifically those that, as
John Jeffries has summarized, would limit judicial discretion based on "the
association of popular sovereignty with legislative primacy and the consequent
illegitimacy of judicial innovation," as well as "the potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of the penal law."' 88 While this argument has some
force with respect to the historical role of judges in the development of
international criminal law,'89 it has less obvious bearing on the relationship
between domestic and international sources of law in the development of ICL.
Considering the democratic deficit inherent in many international institutions,19
those concerned about popular sovereignty and legislative primacy will generally
prefer domestic law.' 9' By the same token, clear ex ante rules will diminish the
potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, but it does not matter for
these purposes whether those rules derive from international or domestic sources.
The development of a hybrid ICL does risk some judicial arbitrariness, however, to
the extent it creates uncertainty about which law to apply (international or
domestic, or which of multiple domestic laws). There may also be cases where the

186. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal

Statutes, 71

VA.

L. REv. 189, 201 (1985) (identifying "notice" and "fair warning" as

common foci ofjustifications of "nulla poena sine lege, the vagueness doctrine, and the rule
of strict construction").
187. See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: JudicialLawmaking at the Intersectionof
Law and Morals, 97 GEo. L.J. 119, 145-46 (2008) [hereinafter Van Schaack, Crimen Sine
Lege].
188. See Jeffries, supranote 186, at 201.
189. See supra PartI.
190. For a more extensive discussion of this problem in the context of the ICC, see
Greenawalt,Justice, supra note 27, at 657-58.
191. This consideration also supplies one of the rationales underlying the concept of the

margin of appreciation in the human rights context. See, e.g., Yuval Shany, Toward a
General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in InternationalLaw? 16 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 907,

908-09 (2005) ("The increased power of judicial review exercised by international courts
over national decision-makers raises a host of problems, mainly involving legitimacy and
capacity concerns. ... A general margin of appreciation doctrine responds to some of these
concerns through the development of less intrusive and, by implication, more politically
acceptable and cost-effective standards of review of national decisions.").
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content of domestic law itself is unclear. I consider below some ways to alleviate
this problem, including in particular, through the development of default principles
of ICL.'92 It remains open to debate, moreover, whether the discretion inherent in
the development of a hybrid ICL is of greater concern than the significant judicial
discretion that otherwise already accompanies the enforcement of ICL.
A final, important consideration is that not all exercises of judicial discretion
equally implicate the core concern of the legality doctrine to prevent retroactive
punishment.' 93 Indeed, the potential for case-by-case development of justifications
and excuses is arguably a central requirement of justice, a necessary protection
against the potentially devastating effects of applying general laws to unanticipated
factual scenarios.194 Thus, even to the extent that legality considerations did raise
some concern about the selective application of domestic law, this concern is
inapposite in cases where domestic law operates to decrease culpability or reduce
punishment.
C. TribunalAdministration

The continued development of ICL as a uniform body of law might also be
justified as a means of facilitating the administration of justice for those who must
apply ICL. There are at least two varieties of arguments that one could make here.
One focuses on uniformity purely as a matter of administrative convenience, and
irrespective of considerations rooted in justice or normative preferences. The other
focuses on underlying political compromises that can be necessary to the
functioning of international justice institutions. I consider each in turn.
1. Administration as Convenience
As with the equal treatment approach, the appeal of a convenience-based
argument requires a certain myopia. The argument applies most obviously to the
work of international criminal tribunals who employ legal professionals from
different legal systems who may lack expertise in the laws of the various
jurisdictions in which ICL offenses have occurred. These tribunals already face
great logistical challengess1s as it stands, and there is an apparent convenience to
settling on a single set of legal standards and applicable precedents.' 96

192. See infra Part V.A.4.
193. This concern is reflected in the phrases nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without
law) and nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law). See supra notes 179-80 and
accompanying text. There is no corollary principle of "no acquittal without law."
194. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 569-70 (1978) [hereinafter
FLETCHER, RETHINKING] (arguing that the prohibition on retroactive punishment should not
"preclude the judicial recognition of new claims of excuse and justification").
195. See Florian Jessberger, International v. National Prosecution of International
Crimes, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supranote 88, at
208, 214 ("[E]xtreme costs, limited capacity and, most importantly, dependence on the

cooperation of states make international prosecutions an undertaking that should (and
realistically, must) be reserved for just a few cases.").
196. This or a related concern appears, for example, to underlie Mirjan Damafika's
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Even from the perspective of international tribunals, however, the convenience
argument has limited force. In the first place, traditional sources of international
law already require international courts to undertake an account of domestic laws in
some contexts.1 97 In the Erdemovid case, the Appeals Chamber surveyed the duress
law of twenty-seven different jurisdictions before concluding that there was no
general principle of law dictating the application of the duress defense to the
circumstances of the case.' 98 In that situation, resort to a single domestic law, for
instance, that of the former Yugoslavia, would, if anything, ease the administration
ofjustice.
Not all international courts, moreover, have been created alike. While the ICC's
jurisdiction stretches across the globe,199 it is unique in this respect. For an ad hoc
tribunal like the ICTR that, for over fifteen years, has exclusively focused on
crimes committed in Rwanda, the prospect of incorporating local law hardly seems
daunting. 200 And in the case of hybrid tribunals like those for Sierra Leone and
Cambodia, the participation of domestic legal officials and a mandate to apply
some domestic criminal law is part of the very mission of the court. 20'
If administrative concerns have limited force for international courts, they have
even less force outside that context. Once more, too great a focus on the needs of
international tribunals threatens to ignore the perspective of domestic courts. For
the latter, the same concerns favor the application of the already familiar domestic
principles that are applied generally to criminal law cases. The cost of uniformity at
the international level is a fracture at the domestic level. To the extent that the ICL
prosecutions are to remain primarily the province of domestic courts, the interests
of domestic administration should be given priority.
The potential trade-off between the respective interests of domestic and
international tribunals suggests, moreover, that ICL applied by international
tribunals should not be conceived of as universally mandatory ICL. If, for example,
the Rome Statute's relatively detailed criminal code reflects, in part, interests of
administration and convenience that are particular to the ICC, then perhaps some of
concern that the "ideal" of developing ICL in "various garbs" that are "adapted to local legal
culture" is unrealizable because it would "entail fragmentation of international criminal law:
the multiplicity of its variations would be difficult to order in ways capable of preserving the
system's coherence." Damagka, supra note 178, at 349; see also OSIEL, supra note 62, at 4
n. 14 (2008) (querying in the context of Damaika's argument whether "it would ... be
possible to 'harmonize' national variations in the domestic incorporation of international
criminal law on the basis of general principles").
197. See supraPart I.C.; supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
198. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, In 58-61 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997).
199. Absent a referral from the United Nations Security Council, and subject to
additional procedural requirements, the Court can try cases of crimes committed by, or on
the territory of, one of the 108 states that have ratified the treaty. See Rome Statute, supra
note 24, at art. 12. A Security Council referral, however, can extend the Court's reach to
states like Sudan that have not ratified the treaty. See id. at art. 13(b).
200. The example of the ICTY is only slightly more complicated because that tribunal
has focused on crimes committed while Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolving into six
separate states, all of which, nevertheless, enjoy a common legal heritage.
201. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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the law applied by the ICC is in fact specific to the tribunal and does not bind other
courts. The Rome Statute itself provides some support for this view. Article 10,
placed immediately after the definitions of the crimes subject to the ICC's
jurisdiction, states that "[njothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute.' 20 2 Although discussion of Article 10 typically
focuses on the idea that customary international law reaches more broadly than the
ICC's jurisdiction, 203 the provision also reminds us that providing the law for a
particular statute or institution is not the same as establishing a universally binding
law. In other words, if the Rome Statute happens to fill some gaps in substantive
ICL primarily for the convenience of agreeing on a single approach for purposes of
the ICC's own jurisprudence, then there is no particular reason why the ICC's
approach should dictate the jurisprudence of other courts applying ICL.
2. Administration as Political Compromise
A second administration-based concern focuses not on convenience per se, but
on the political preconditions of particular institutional arrangements. The politics
of establishing international tribunals will predictably lead to institutional
compromises that may or may not reflect states' views on their broader legal
obligations.
The most obvious example is the unavailability of the death penalty at the ICC
and other post-Nuremberg tribunals. 2 0 The matter proved especially divisive
during the drafting of the ICC's statute, when groups of states respectively lobbied
both in favor of and against the provision of capital punishment. 205 Ultimately, the
states opposing the death penalty carried the day, while states favoring its
availability succeeded in including a provision specifying that the Rome Statute's
penalty provisions were without prejudice to penalties available under national
law. 206 This outcome, therefore, is consistent with a view that international law
permits capital punishment for ICL offenses outside the particular institutional
context of the ICC.

202. Rome Statute, supranote 24, at art. 10.
203. See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 120, at 23 ("Those who argue that customary law
goes beyond the Statute, for example by prohibiting the use of certain weapons that are not
listed in Article 8, can rely on [Article 10]. It will become more and more important in the
future, because customary law should evolve and the Statute may not be able to keep pace
with it.").
204. Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 25, at art. 19(1) (limiting penalties to life
imprisonment); ECCC Statute, supra note 25, at art. 10 (same); Rome Statute, supranote 24,
at art. 77 (same); ICTR Statute, supra note 42, at art. 23(1) (same); ICTY Statute, supra note
41, at art. 24(1) (same).
205. See SCHABAS, supra note 120, at 140 ("The debate about capital punishment
threatened to undo the Rome Conference.").
206. See id. at 140-41; Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 80 ("Nothing in this Part
affects the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law, nor the law of
States which do not provide for penalties prescribed in this Part.").
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States may also have special concerns about the delegation involved in
establishing these institutions. The ceding of authority to an international court,
after all, necessarily involves a loss of control, especially on the part of those states
whose citizens or territory are subject to the court's jurisdiction. Delegation
concerns played a particularly decisive role in the drafting of the Rome Statute,
when the United States led an effort to restrict the ICC's unprecedented reach as a
permanent standing tribunal possessed with authority to investigate and prosecute
cases absent specific authorization from a political body. 207 Although this effort
focused mostly on the role of the U.N. Security Council in triggering ICC
investigations, it also impacted the tribunal's substantive law. For instance, U.S.
concerns about U.S. peacekeeping troops facing ICC prosecution resulted in the
statutory proviso that "[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in
particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes." 208 The Rome Statute's apparent exclusion of

recklessness as a general mens rea also likely reflects a decision to reserve the ICC
as an institution for the most serious criminal acts.209 To the extent these provisions
reflect ICC-focused considerations, however, they should not be read to reflect
broader judgments about culpability under ICL.
Thus, as with convenience-based concerns, the requirements of political
compromise may produce forms of uniform law that are tribunal specific rather
than universal in reach.
D. Normative Development

Advocates of a uniform ICL might also see in ICL a path toward general
normative development in the criminal law. According to this view, the goal of ICL
is not merely to regulate and prosecute international crimes but, more broadly, to
operate as a kind of model penal code that provides the best solutions to problems
of criminal law, even with respect to issues that are not unique to the international
context. In this way, ICL serves a dual function. It provides the "hard law" that
punishes the commission of actual ICL offense, and it simultaneously provides
exemplary or "soft law" intended to exert a broader influence on the criminal law.
It is hard to dispute the general value of ICL adopting the most normatively
appealing legal principles whenever possible. A ready example is the important

207. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, The UnitedStates and the InternationalCriminal Court,
93 AM. J.INT'L L. 12 (1999); David Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
Holds News Conference at National Press Club (July 31, 1998) (transcript available at 1998
WL 431804).
208. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 8(1); see also Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of
the ICC: Past, Present, and Future, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 61, 69 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
209. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 30(1) ("Unless otherwise provided, a person
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge."). The
ICC's early case law, however, reflects a split regarding whether the Rome Statute definition
of "intent" should be interpreted to encompass the civil law concept of dolus eventualis,
which is roughly analogous to the common law concept of recklessness. See supra note 91.
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role that international tribunals have played in developing international law relating
to crimes against women, including rape and other forms of sex-related violence.2 0
Although international prosecutions of sexual violence have necessarily focused on
offenses that can be categorized as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide,
international trials may also call attention to sexual violence in its
often-neglected domestic setting. Advocates of a uniform ICL may therefore see
in ICL the potential to disseminate criminal standards that may reach beyond the
context of ICL cases and promote reform in domestic law.
This reasoning works best in cases where the normative pull of ICL's chosen
approach is strong, and there is sufficient state consensus on the issue that ICL may
commit itself to a single position without excessive controversy or damage to its
perceived legitimacy. The problem, however, is that not all legal questions yield a
single "best" answer, and some are divisive in ways that render their resolution
especially controversial. The very diversity among domestic criminal legal systems
suggests that the search for uniformity inevitably involves partiality and
controversy.
Although this problem holds true with respect to domestic institutions as well,
ICL faces special legitimacy challenges given the democratic deficit inherent in
legislating criminal law at the international level,2 3 which inevitably renders the
law less accountable to any particular populace whom it affects. For that reason,
domestic institutions may be better equipped to resolve more divisive matters of
criminal law. ICL, by contrast, may preserve its legitimacy precisely by remaining
silent on contested questions, leaving their evolution to domestic law until
sufficient consensus has developed to support enshrining a norm into international
law. As Paul Schiff Berman has argued more broadly regarding the normative
advantages of global legal pluralism, "jj]ust as states in a federal system function as
'laboratories' of innovation,
so too the preservation of diverse legal spaces makes
214
innovation possible."

210. See generallyJanet Halley, Rape at Rome: FeministInterventions in Criminalization
of Sex-Related Offenses in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L. L. I

(2008) (surveying feminist influences on the recognition and definition of sex-related crimes
at the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC).
211. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Int'l Crim.
Trib. For Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (genocide and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovi&, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (war crimes and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1 -A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 21, 2000) (war crimes).
212. See M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98, 1 101-08 (2003), available at
http://www.echr.coe.intleng (relying in part on ICL definitions of the underlying offense of
rape to rule that Bulgaria had failed in its obligation to effectively punish rape in the context
of ordinary offenses regulated by Bulgaria's national laws); Baylis, supra note 26, at 37
(arguing, in the context of prosecuting crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, that resort to Rome Statute definitions provided a superior definition of the
underlying offense of rape than would have resulted from applying national law).
213. See Greenawalt,Justice, supra note 27, at 657-58.
214. Berman, supra note 23, at 1190-91 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
580-81 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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It is far from accepted, moreover, that international criminal tribunals have been
especially good at substantive criminal law. A growing body of scholarship has
raised troubling doubts about these tribunals' commitments to core principles of
justice-in particular, the principles of personal culpability, legality, and fair
labeling of offenses-that they purport to espouse and that many domestic legal
systems take for granted.215 In the words of Daryl Robinson, "serious issues about
ICL's compliance with its fundamental principles may . .. be found in many ...
doctrines, including sweeping modes of liability, expanding definitions of crimes,
and reticence towards defences."2 16
A central concern is that the problem goes beyond the unavoidable circumstance
of judges reaching some bad decisions. Instead, the concern is that a structural
bias-rooted both in the general gravity of the mass atrocities that tribunals have
addressed and in the influence of a broader human rights-based concern for the
protection of victims-has tilted ICL jurisprudence in an unacceptably proprosecution direction. 217
These problems are compounded by two additional factors. First, a growing
consensus has emerged that case selection at international tribunals like the ICC
should target only the worst of the worst, leaving the vast majority of offendersincluding the Erdemovids of the world-to be processed by domestic courts. 218
This strategy deepens the risk that tribunal case law will reflect an inordinate
concern with securing convictions and produce bad law whose injustice only
becomes apparent when applied to harder cases heard only by domestic tribunals.
To the extent that the harder cases become primarily the domain of domestic courts,
it makes additional sense to entrust some of ICL's legal development to local
discretion.
In addition, the tribunals' routine reliance on the prior case law of international
tribunals helps ensure that bad decisions are replicated by future international
tribunals. 219 While greater reliance on domestic law might not offer a complete
solution, it may offer at least one positive step in ICL's rediscovery of a criminal
law that better aspires to ICL's liberal aims.

215. See Diane Marie Amann, ImpartialityDeficit and InternationalCriminal Judging,
in ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND TRANSITIONAL JusTicE 208

(Edel Hughes. William A. Schabas & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2007); Allison Marston Danner
& Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, andthe Development ofInternational CriminalLaw, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 101
(2005); Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 73, at 541; Robinson, supra note 62.
216. Robinson, supra note 62, at 927.
217. See generally Robinson, supra note 62, at 929 (arguing that the influence of
"influence of assumptions of human rights and humanitarian law," on ICL, alongside other
possible influences such as the gravity of the crimes and institutional or reputational

concerns, "actively works at cross-purposes to fundamental criminal principles").
218. See, e.g.,

POLICY

INT'L CRIMINAL COURT OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME

BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 7 (Sept. 2003),
http://www.amice.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9 03.pdf (announcing the policy of the ICC
Prosecutor's office to "focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on
those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation
allegedly responsible for those crimes" (emphasis omitted)).
219. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
ISSUES
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Concerns that are specially focused on judicial attitudes may be allayed to some
degree by more detailed codification along the lines of the Rome Statute, but this
approach too has its drawbacks, In the first place, the underlying problem of
legitimating international regulation in the face of domestic pluralism exists
regardless of the specific modus of international lawmaking. Second, the
extraordinary consensus required for multilateral treaty making is better suited to
political compromise than to normative advancement where disputed issues are
concerned. 220 Third, these same dynamics make the law uniquely resistant to
change. Amending the Rome Statute, for example, generally requires the
ratification of seven-eighths of the States Parties, thus making future refinements
next to impossible through the formal amendment process. 221 One of the classic
rationales for tolerating legal pluralism, by contrast, is that doing so promotes
reform precisely by allowing continued experimentation in the law.222 Finally, no
codification process can elitminate the need for judicial construction, thus ensuring
that the ICC's judges will inevitably assert substantial control over the court's lawin-action.223
All of these considerations reinforce the wisdom of Article 10's qualification
that the terms of the Rome Statute should not be read to limit or prejudice existing
or developing rules of international law.224 As I have already detailed, the states
negotiating the Rome Statute had good reasons to insist upon a relatively detailed
statute for the ICC itself, but this agreement should not be read to impose a single
set of ICL rules to be imposed by all tribunals trying ICL offenses.

220. For a related point, see generally Chimbne Keitner, Comment, Crafting the
InternationalCriminal Court: Trials and Tribulations in Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 215 (2001) (analyzing the trade-off between developing consistent

international law and achieving political consensus in the context of the Rome Statute's
negotiation).
221. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 121(4); see also Van Schaack, Crimen Sine
Lege, supra note 187, at 137 ("The only way treaties can be amended is through the sporadic
and sluggish multilateral treaty drafting process. Indeed, states are loath to renegotiate
existing treaties, not only because of the transaction costs inherent to such an endeavor, but
also because of the confusion wrought in trying to keep track of which states have ratified
which version of which treaty."). In June 2010, the ICC's Assembly of States Parties
adopted a proposed amendment adding the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute, and in
doing so took the view that the 718th ratification requirement did not apply to Articles 5, 6, 7,
and 8 of the Rome Statute, which identify the offenses over which the ICC has subject
matter jurisdiction. David Scheffer, States Parties Approve New Crimes for International

Criminal Court, ASIL INSIGHTs (June 22, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insightsl00622.cfmn;
see supra note 120. At minimum, however, a two-thirds majority of States Parties is required
to adopt an amendment prior to ratification, see Rome Statute, supranote 24, at art. 121(3),
and amendments to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 do not bind non-ratifying states, see id., at art.
121(5).
222. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 88-107.
224. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 10.
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E. Avoiding JurisdictionalChaos
Concerns about pluralism in ICL may also focus on another problem: Which
domestic law should ICL defer to in any given case? Depending on the facts of the
case, any number of jurisdictions may claim the power to apply their own criminal
laws based on the locus of the alleged crimes, the nationality of the suspect and
victims, the fact that the crime in question may have been directed against the
security of a particular state, or the fact that the crime is one subject to universal
jurisdiction.225 One convenience of a uniform ICL lies in its ability to avoid the
potential chaos involved in choosing an applicable law.
Although the problem of jurisdictional reach is real, it should not receive
overriding weight in determining the reach of ICL. In the first place, the
perpetration of ICL offenses need not trigger difficulties of this sort. As I have
already outlined, the focus of international criminal tribunals in recent years has
been predominantly on internal conflicts in which perpetrators and victims are cocitizens of the state in which the crimes took place.226 In these cases, there is little
doubt as to which national law is most relevant. In cases where jurisdictional
conflicts do arise, moreover, the problem is not unique to ICL offenses, or indeed
to criminal law. Jurisdictional conflicts can arise whenever conduct implicates
overlapping domestic laws. The question of how to resolve such conflicts of law is
a central problem of the international law of extraterritorial jurisdiction.227 The
problem, moreover, already complicates the work of the ICC to the extent the Court
must decide which domestic investigations are entitled to deference under the
2
Rome Statute's complementarity framework,m
and which jurisdictions deserve
consideration under Article 21's mandate to consult "the national laws of States
that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime." 229
A court faced with conflicting national laws may resolve the conflict by
identifying the jurisdiction that has the greatest interest in the offense. 230 Domestic
courts may apply a similar analysis in deciding whether to prosecute or extradite
suspects7 31 Traditionally, authorities have given greatest priority to the territory of

225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987) (identifying
bases of jurisdiction to prescribe); JAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 301-14 (7th ed. 2008) (same).
226. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
227. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., I May-9 June and 3 July-11 August
2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, Annex E, [hereinafter International Law Commission,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note
225, §§ 402,403.
228. Pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible when "[t]he
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Rome
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 17(l)(a). The Statute does not specify which bases of
jurisdiction are to be privileged under this framework.
229. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 21.

230. This is the approach endorsed by the American Law Institute in its Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
supra note 225, § 403 (jurisdiction to prescribe); id. at § 404 (jurisdiction to adjudicate).
231. Seeid.at§421.
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the crime. 232 The territorial preference also reveals itself in the statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, which provides jurisdiction over some domestic crimes
based on the territory of the offenses, 3 and in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR,
which require consideration of Yugoslav and Rwandan law respectively for
sentencing purposes.1 4 The ICC Statute gives pride of place to both the territory of
crimes and the nationality of perpetrators when determining jurisdiction based on
state ratification of the treaty.235
In cases where it is too difficult to identify a single state with the greatest
interest, the trying court could resort to other options. In cases where overlapping
domestic laws do not, in fact, conflict, the court need not choose between them. As
I explore below, moreover, default ICL rules may be useful in cases where the
applicable domestic law is too difficult to determine. The resolution of these hard
cases, however, need not prejudice the outcomes of those not infrequent cases
where the applicable domestic law is obvious.
IV. ERDEMOVle AND THE LIMITS OF A UNITARY ICL
I return now to Erdemovi, which provides an especially fascinating case study
for considering the competing interests of international and domestic law in the
prosecution of ICL offenses. As I argue below, the problem of duress presents a
particularly powerful case for resort to domestic law given: (1) the silence of
authoritative international legal sources concerning the applicability of the duress
defense to murder, (2) the disagreement among domestic legal systems on the
issue, (3) the Court's inability to articulate why the special context or purpose of
ICL requires a specific result, (4) the normative shortcomings of both the majority
and dissent's approaches, and (5) the availability of a suitable approach under
applicable domestic law.
A. The Majority's Rejection of the Defense
I consider first the majority conclusion that ICL precluded the use of duress as a
complete defense to Erdemovi6's actions. Judges McDonald and Vohrah's plurality
opinion (tracked, in important respects, by Judge Li's separate opinion) 236 is

232. See International Law Commission, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 227,
18 ("[T]he 'territoriality principle' is considered the primary basis for jurisdiction in
criminal law matters. . .. "); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note
225, § 403 cmt. f at 247 ("[T)he presence of substantial foreign elements will ordinarily
weigh against application of criminal law. In such cases, legislative intent to subject conduct
outside the state's territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis of express
statement or clear implication.").
233. See Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 25, at art. 1(1) (establishing jurisdiction over
the "serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed

in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996").
234. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
235. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 12(2).

236. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Li (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
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remarkable both for its open embrace of policy considerations, and also for its
attempt to root its conclusion in the distinct purposes of ICL. The opinion expressly
divorces its analysis from domestic law considerations by emphasizing the special
gravity of the crimes at issue: "Whilst reserving our comments on the appropriate
rule for domestic national contexts," the plurality notes, "we cannot but stress that
we are not, in the International Tribunal, concerned with ordinary domestic crimes.
The purview of the International Tribunal relates to war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in armed conflicts of extreme violence with egregious
dimensions."237
Considerations of gravity, as I have already detailed, play a central role in the
theory of ICL.2 3 8 But it is not enough to simply state the general gravity of the
offense. How exactly do considerations of gravity shape ICL's answer to the
specific problem of duress? The majority's response fails on multiple counts. First,
there is the problem of identifying what sort of gravity is operative in the first
instance. Judges McDonald and Vohrah identify-without distinguishingdifferent sorts of gravity at play involving different levels of generality: there is the
gravity of Erdemovid's own deeds, the gravity of the broader massacre in which he
participated, the combined gravity of the crimes associated with the war in the
former Yugoslavia, and the general gravity of war crimes and crimes against
humanity as a whole.239 Notwithstanding this analytical confusion, the plurality
arrives at a relatively blanket holding: "[D)uress," it maintains, "cannot afford a
complete defence to a soldier charged with crimes against humanity or war crimes
in international law involving the taking of innocent lives." 240 The particular scale
of Erdemovi6's own acts is largely irrelevant, therefore. It matters only that he was
a soldier, that he took an innocent life, and that he committed war crimes.
At times, Judges McDonald and Vohrah appear to assign the concept of gravity
almost talismanic significance. They note that if one accepts the general common
law denial of a complete defense for cases "in which a single innocent life is
extinguished due to action under duress," then "international law . . . cannot admit

duress in cases which involve the slaughter of innocent human beings on a large
scale." 241 True enough, but what then of "the civil law jurisdictions [that] allow

237. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi&, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
75 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997).
238. See supra Part 1I.B.
239. Prosecutor v. Erdernovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 11 22, 37 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997).
240. Id. 88. Judge's Li's opinion does not explicitly limit the analysis to soldiers, and
instead endorses the apparently broader holding that "that duress can only be a mitigating
circumstance and is not a defence to the massacre of innocent persons." Prosecutor v.
Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, 1 12 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997). Neither opinion highlights this
apparent point of difference, however, and in the very next sentence Judge Li states that his
"view agrees with and is in support of the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and
Vohrah." Id.
241. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi&, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 1 75 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
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duress as a defence to murder"? 242 The answer, once again, is gravity: "It cannot be
denied that in an armed conflict, the frequency of situations in which persons are
forced under duress to commit crimes and the magnitude of the crimes they are
forced to commit are far greater than in any peacetime domestic environment." 243
This is not to say that gravity is irrelevant to the question of duress. To the
contrary, the traditional common law approach emphasizes gravity considerations
by allowing duress as a complete defense to some crimes, but not to murder.244 The
proportionality approach incorporates gravity in a different way by demanding that
the perpetrator not cause a greater evil than is averted.245 Even theorists who would
broaden the defense acknowledge that the law may demand heroic self-sacrifice
where doing so would save an especially high number of lives. 246 Gravity, in sum,
is relevant under any account, but the law can and does take account of gravity in
different ways. The challenge is to justify the Erdemovid court's categorical
rejection of duress in the context of soldiers accused of murderous war crimes
while also defending the court's agnosticism regarding whether the defense should
apply in other homicide cases. The fact that armed conflict may confront with
greater "frequency" crimes of great magnitude committed under duress is hardly
reassuring as support for a blanket rule.
Elsewhere, the focus in Judges McDonald and Vohrah's opinion is on
deterrence. The plurality highlights the "protection of the weak and vulnerable" as
a "prime objective" of international humanitarian law, and it expresses the concern
that "in relation to the most heinous crimes known to humankind, the principles of
law to which we give credence have the appropriate normative effect upon soldiers
bearing weapons of destruction and upon the commanders who control them in
armed conflict situations." 247 This argument does not fare much better.
The judges are rightly troubled by the dynamics of mass atrocity in which
criminality takes the form of a systematic, organized campaign that mobilizes
countless perpetrators who likely never would have committed such horrendous
acts absent the broader context of organized, officially sanctioned violence. It is
this concern that gives particular resonance to the quotation of Lord Simon's
opinion in Lynch v. DPPfor Northern Ireland, which focused on similar "social

1997).
242. Id.176.
243. Id.
244. See Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality,41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 751-54 (2008).
245. Id. at 770.
246. See, e.g., FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 194, at 833 ("[I]f the cost in human
lives is sufficiently high, we could properly expect someone to resist threats to his own
life."); Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its ProperLimits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1373-74 (1989) ("Society . . . has a right to
expect a person to demonstrate a higher level of moral strength when ordered to kill a

hundred innocent children than when commanded to kill one.").
247. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 1 75 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997); see also id. 1 88 (appealing to the court's "mandated obligation under the Statute to
ensure that international humanitarian law, which is concerned with the protection of
humankind, is not in any way undermined").
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evils which might be attendant on the recognition of general defence of duress."248
"Would it not," Lord Simon asks, "enable a gang leader of notorious violence to
confer on his organisation by terrorism immunity from the criminal law? Every
member of his gang might well be able to say with truth, 'It was as much as my life
was worth to disobey."' 249 Judge Li's separate opinion puts the matter in even
stronger terms, arguing that:
Admission of duress as a complete defence or justification in the
massacre of innocent persons is tantamount to both encouraging the
subordinate under duress to kill such persons with impunity instead of
deterring him from committing such a horrendous crime, and also
helping the superior in his attempt to kill them. Such an anti-human
policy of law the international community can never tolerate, and this
International Tribunal can never adopt. 250
As a general matter, the special dangers of mass atrocity are indeed justifiably a
central concern of ICL.2 5 But the judges' talk of deterrence and humanitarian
protection has limited purchase in the context of duress. The perpetrator who kills
with a gun to his head will hardly be deterred by the perhaps distant threat of future
incarceration. As Immanuel Kant noted, "no punishment threatened by the law
could be greater than losing [one's] life."25 2 Indeed, one of the traditional
justifications for the defense focuses on the diminished capacity of persons in
Erdemovid's position.2 53 This point is as true in the domestic context as it is in the
international context, and the Erdemovid majority gives it no explicit attention but
to argue that "soldiers or combatants are expected to exercise fortitude and a
greater degree of resistance to a threat than civilians" because "[sloldiers, by the
very nature of their occupation, must have envisaged the possibility of violent death
in pursuance of the cause for which they fight."2 54 There is, however, a difference
between "envisag[ing] the possibility of violent death" and actually facing the

248. Lynch v. DPP for N. Ir., (19751 A.C. 653, 687-88, quoted in Prosecutor v.
Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah, 173 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
249. Lynch, [1975] A.C. at 687-88, quoted in Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-9622-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 75 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
250. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Li, 8 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).
251.

See supraPart II.B.
IMMANUEL KANT, Introduction to the Elements of Justice, in THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 33, 41 (John Ladd trans., 1965); see also Claire 0. Finkelstein,
Duress: A PhilosophicalAccount of the Defense in Law, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 251, 263 (1995)

252.

(quoting the same and observing that "Kant[) defended the duress defense on deterrence
grounds").

253. See Chiesa, supra note 244, at 759. As Chiesa notes, however, diminished capacity
to reason might not provide a fully satisfactory account. Id.
254. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 1 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997).
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precise sort of pressure that Erdemovid faced, and the majority provides no support
for its expectation that combatants as a class are better able to resist that pressure
than civilians are. This point, moreover, does nothing to support the majority's
emphasis on deterrence as the combatant who does have the fortitude to sacrifice
himself remains unlikely to be acting out of fear of incarceration.
Most remarkable, the Erdemovie majority contradicts its own emphasis on
deterrence by maintaining that "[tlhe law, in our view, does not 'expect' a person
whose life is threatened to be hero [sic] and to sacrifice his life by refusing to
commit the criminal act demanded of him."2 55 For that reason, Judge McDonald
and Vohrah embrace the approach of English judges who "have consistently argued
that in cases of murder, duress could in appropriate cases be taken into account in
mitigation of sentence, executive pardon or recommendations to the Parole
Board."2 s6 In this way, the plurality seeks to escape the "difficulties [that] are clear
where the court must decide whether or not duress is a defence by a straight
answer, 'yes' or 'no."' 251 But the law cannot hope to deter a person from conduct
that is not "expect[ed]" to be abandoned. Why then should Erdemovid be punished
at all? 2m8
As Luis Chiesa has observed, the majority's reasoning reveals a blindness to the
distinction between justification and excuse in the criminal law. 25 9 The concern
about "straight answers" implicitly treats duress as a justification and reflects the
concern that granting Erdemovid's defense would somehow endorse his behavior.
The criminal law is more nuanced than that, however. Not every complete defense
purports to justify the accused's behavior, and duress in particular typically
operates as an excuse rather than as a justification. The law may maintain that
Erdemovid's actions were regrettable and that self-sacrifice would have been the
morally desirable choice while at the same time acknowledging, as the majority
did, that self-sacrifice may be too much to expect under the circumstances.
Embracing this nuanced perspective does not require downgrading duress into a
mere partial defense that offers only mitigation of punishment. Instead, if the law
does not expect self-sacrifice on Erdemovid's part, it should afford a complete
defense while recognizing that his behavior is merely excused, rather than justified.
B. The Dissent/ Rome Statute Approach
Two of the five judges who heard Erdemovid's appeal dissented, arguing that
duress may provide a complete defense to murder provided the defense passes a
strict proportionality test that is common to civil law jurisdictions: there must be "a
high probability that the person under duress will not be able to save the lives of the

255. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 85 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997).
256. Id. 186.

257. Id. 81.

258. On remand, the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovid to five years' incarceration.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 1 23 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998).
259. Chiesa, supranote 244, at 746-48.
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victims whatever he does." 260 Erdemovid's case would have met this test because
his self-sacrifice likely would not have saved lives: had he disobeyed he would
have joined the victims, who would have perished at the hands of Erdemovi's
commanders anyway. This approach to duress would also exclude a complete
defense in cases where a perpetrator saved his own life at the expense of his
victims. Although this view did not carry the day in Erdemovie itself, it has
received subsequent vindication in the Rome Statute, which extends a complete
defense to a perpetrator acting under "duress resulting from a threat of imminent
death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or
another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this
threat."2 6 ' For these purposes, the statute does not distinguish between murder and
other crimes, but it limits the defense to cases where "the person does not intend to
cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided." 262
While the dissenters' more permissive approach avoids the majority's pitfall of
drawing an arbitrary line between murder and other crimes, it suffers from a
surprisingly similar defect. The strict proportionality requirement implicitly treats
duress as a justification rather than an excuse.2 6 3 In other words, the requirement
that Erdemovid pursue the greater good by avoiding the lesser harm suggests that
the law may in some way be endorsing his choice. If, however, duress is better
characterized as an excuse in these circumstances, then the defense should not
require the achievement of a socially desirable result. The point of excusing
Erdemovid is not to endorse his actions, but to acknowledge the difficulty of the
extreme coercion he faced. As Chiesa observes, "ft]he reason excused actors are
acquitted is that it is not fair to blame them for their actions, not that their actions
were right. Thus, the only pertinent inquiry is whether society could have
reasonably required the defendant to overcome the coercion and resist the
threats." 264 On the other hand, the defense must have some limits. Most would
agree, for example, that saving one's own life is not a tolerable reason to cause the
destruction of a crowded city.265
C. Embracing Pluralism
How then should the ICTY have resolved the Erdemovie appeal? One option
would be to craft a normatively superior duress doctrine. Chiesa, for example, has
advanced an alternate theory of duress that dispenses with strict utilitarian
balancing in favor of a broader range of factors-including, for example, the
special duties that soldiers owe to innocent civilians, the gravity of the harm
caused, and the likelihood that the perpetrator would have saved lives by refusing
to comply-to determine whether, on balance, society should deem the

260. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cassese,

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997).

Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 31(l)(d).
Id.
See Chiesa, supra note 244, at 749-50.
Id. at 753.
See id, at 756-57.
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perpetrator's choice "understandable" and thus excuse his wrongful conduct. 2 6
While this proposal has normative attraction, immediate adoption at the
international level would require international tribunals or treaty makers to endorse
a legal doctrine that is neither particular to the international context nor reflective
of current domestic practice. While that is certainly possible, and perhaps even
desirable, future evolution of basic principles of criminal law is more likely to
begin at the domestic level.
Alternatively, the ICTY could have consulted the most directly applicable local
law for guidance. In Erdemovi6's case, this would be the law of the former
Yugoslavia, and, in particular, that of Bosnia and Herzegovnia. As it happens, that
law would likely have exonerated Erdemovid. Mirroring the dissenters' approach, it
allows a complete defense of "extreme necessity" for acts "performed in order that
the offender avert from himself or from another an immediate danger which could
not have been averted in any other way, provided that the evil created thereby does
not exceed the one which was threatening him."267 The law does not distinguish
between murder and other crimes. It does, however, exclude a complete defense in
cases where "the perpetrator himself has negligently created the danger, or if he has
exceeded the limits of extreme necessity," as well as in cases "where the
perpetrator was under an obligation to expose himself to the danger."268
As Judge Cassese's dissent argued, the ICTY could have reached that result
strictly based on retroactivity considerations.269 Concerns about retroactivity,
however, are somewhat less compelling in the context of excused wrongful conduct
where fair notice has little role to play. Erdemovid could hardly argue that he
reasonably relied on the legality of his conduct: doing so would have undermined
his claim of duress by suggesting that his conduct was, in fact, deterrable.
Cassese's last resort approach, moreover, says nothing about the longer-term
desirability of developing a uniform ICL of duress. That approach is entirely
consistent with the majority's view that ICL should assert a uniform answer to the

266. See id. at 771-72.
267. Krivicni Zakon Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Criminal Code of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], art. 10, Sluzbeni List Socialisticke
Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) (Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (SFRY)], No. 44/1977, 1977 (reflecting the law prevailing prior to the

breakup of the former Yugoslavia). Bosnia subsequently enacted a criminal code that mirrors
the approach to duress reflected in earlier Yugoslav law. See Krivicni Zakon Bosne i
Hercegovine [KZBiH] (Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina], art. 25, Sluibeni glasnik
Bosne i Hercegovine [Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina], No. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03,
54/04, 61/04, 30(05, 2006.
268. Krivicni Zakon Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Criminal Code of
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], art. 10, Sluzbeni List Socialisticke
Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) (Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (SFRY)}, No. 44/1977, 1977 (reflecting the law prevailing prior to the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia). Bosnia subsequently enacted a criminal code that mirrors
the approach to duress reflected in earlier Yugoslav law. See Krivicni Zakon Bosne i
Hercegovine [KZBiH] [Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina], art. 25, Sluibeni glasnik
Bosne i Hercegovine [Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina), No. 3103, 32103, 37/03,
54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 2006.
269. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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problem of duress, and do so in way that denies the excuse to soldiers accused of
murder.
A more robust rationale for applying Yugoslav law highlights the positive
benefits of doing so. By affording Erdemovid the same defense available to other
criminal suspects in the former Yugoslavia, the tribunal would have fostered a
uniform application of domestic law, and protected against arbitrary and
unprincipled distinctions among similarly situated defendants. In this instance,
Yugoslav law happens to correspond to the view of both the Erdemovid dissenters
and the subsequently enacted Rome Statute. 270
Applying the Yugoslav law of duress would also have the additional advantage
of saving ICL from commitment to the normative shortcomings of the dissenters'
approach. A resort to domestic law allows ICL to decide the case while remaining
agnostic on the underlying philosophical difficulties that pervade domestic
approaches to duress. Rather than freeze a single, debated perspective as the single
correct approach under ICL, deference to domestic law encourages the continued
development of duress law at the local level, deferring judgment until such time as
a sufficient consensus may develop to justify a uniform ICL law of duress.
This is not to say, of course, that ICL should take no position on the acceptable
boundaries of the duress defense, or that it must blindly defer to any domestic law
defense that labels itself duress. The argument for deference rests on the conclusion
that the applicable domestic law is within an acceptable range of options available
to a state committed to vindicating the purposes of ICL, including core principles
of justice. The Erdemovid example presents a relatively easy case considering (1)
the silence of existing ICL sources, (2) the availability of applicable Yugoslav law
that embraces a relatively standard approach to duress, embraced by many civil law
jurisdictions, and (3) that applying Yugoslav law would ensure treatment consistent
with all similarly situated offenders, without fear of special discrimination against
accountability for ICL offenses.
V. BEYOND ERDEMOVR^:

RE-CONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Although the Erdemovie decision presents an especially compelling case study
of the limits of ICL, the concerns it raises are in no way limited to the specific
context of duress. They arise whenever ICL confronts problems whose resolution
has more to do with general problems of criminal responsibility than with interests
that are integral to the establishment of ICL itself. One way to approach the issue is
to frame it in expressive terms. What message does the law send by declaring a
particular rule of ICL? When the Genocide Convention defines genocide and
declares the offense to be a crime under international law, it broadcasts the gravity
and intolerability of this specific offense in a manner clearly justified by the gravity
and enforcement-based approaches to ICL that I have already outlined. But when
an international tribunal rules that duress is no defense to murder, develops
principles of individual liability, or identifies general sentencing guidelines, it
sends a different message, one much more focused on the general question of what

270. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 31(d).
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it means to be a criminal. In those cases, the demands of ICL become weaker as the
link to ICL's core interests become more tenuous.
It is time for the theory of ICL to take more specific account of how these
differences impact international law's content. In this Part, I outline such a theory,
one that rejects the universalist aspiration to pronounce a monolithic, uniform code
of ICL, and instead embraces a more flexible account of the law, one that gives
different weight to different legal principles depending on the strength of ICL's
interest to control the specific norm in question. I first outline an expanded, fourtiered account of substantive ICL, and then briefly consider its implications for
different procedural contexts.
A. Four Tiers ofInternationalCriminalLaw

Rather than take the form of a single, universal criminal code, ICL should be
recharacterized to reflect four distinct tiers of law: (1) universally binding law, (2)
tribunal-specific law, (3) restraints on domestic law, and (4) default law. I outline
each category below with specific examples. In so doing, I aspire neither to
elaborate a comprehensive account of ICL's content nor to deny room for
reasonable disagreement concerning what that content should be. Rather, my aim is
to enunciate a more general framework that provides a basis for further analysis
and discussion.
1. Universally Binding Law
My framework accepts that ICL properly establishes certain universally binding
requirements. Principal among these are the basic elements of ICL offenses.
Consistent with the enforcement-based approach to ICL, the elements of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other ICL offenses delimit the sphere of
criminal activity that triggers special international concern and gives rise to unique
jurisdictional consequences. 271 Gravity considerations also play a rote, as the
elements of crimes often serve to emphasize the unique gravity of the offenses in
questions.
Even here there is some room for ambiguity as states might decide to prosecute
such conduct using different labels. For example, a state might prosecute genocidal
acts under its regular murder law, or even as some form of aggravated hate crime,
without explicitly designating the offense as genocide. Should ICL tolerate that
decision? The question is complex, and gains even greater complexity when one
considers that there are other ways beyond formal labels to convey gravity-for
example, in the conduct of the trial or in the sentencing judgment. Nevertheless, my

271. In this respect, my category of universally binding law overlaps with the idea that
the core ICL offenses are jus cogens norms from which no state may derogate. See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension
Between States' Interests and the Pursuit of International Justice, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 131, 131. For my
purposes, however, the critical question is to determine not whether these crimes are jus
cogens in some broad sense, but precisely how much of the applicable law is in fact
universal.
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approach accepts that gravity considerations have a role to play in ICL, and that
ICL may legitimately demand that states adopt the labels ICL has devised to
describe criminal conduct.272
I would also include in the category of universally binding norms some rules
that belong to the general part of the criminal law but which have special
application to international crimes. For example, the respective doctrines creating
special forms of liability for commanders and determining the relevance of illegal
superior orders have emerged as special rules of criminal law that regulate the
operation of military and military-like hierarchies in the specific contexts of armed
conflict and mass criminality.27 Given the centrality of these contexts to the core
ICL offenses, it is therefore appropriate for ICL to define these doctrines more
narrowly, with less, if any, room for domestic discretion.
2. Tribunal-Specific Law
Other rules of ICL reflect the dictates of specific tribunals without necessarily
reflecting universally binding law. In this context, I have already made reference to

272. In its broad outlines, this approach is consistent with the ICTR Appeals Chamber's
refusal to refer the prosecution of a suspect to Norway on the ground that Norway, lacking a
genocide statute, would have pursued prosecution under its murder statute. See Prosecutor v.
Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR l lbis, Decision on Rule 1Ibis Appeal (Aug. 30,
2006). Although "appreciat[ing] fully that Norway's proposed prosecution of Mr.
Bagaragaza, even under the general provisions of its criminal code, intends to take due
account of and treat with due gravity the alleged genocidal nature of the acts underlying his
present indictment," the Appeals Chamber noted that "in the end, any acquittal or conviction
and sentence would still only reflect conduct legally characterized as the 'ordinary crime' of
homicide." Id. 1 17. It therefore rejected the referral both on the ground that the ICTR's
statute would have allowed reprosecution of the suspect for genocide irrespective of the
domestic prosecution outcome, and on the ground that "the protected legal values are
different. The penalization of genocide protects specifically defined groups, whereas the
penalization of homicide protects individual lives." Id. The strictness of the ICTR's
approach, however, risks turning the issue into one of pure semantics, especially considering
the Court's acceptance that Norwegian proceedings would have "treat[ed] with due gravity
the alleged genocidal nature of the acts underlying . .. [the] indictment." Id. Note, however,
that the text of the Rome Statute suggests a more flexible approach for the International
Criminal Court. It provides, with limited exceptions, that "[n]o person who has been tried by
another court for conduct also proscribed [by the Rome Statute] shall be tried by the Court
with respect to the same conduct." Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 20(3). This phrasing
suggests that another court might prosecute a suspect for the "same conduct" under a
different legal label.
273. Notably, international instruments have consistently given special attention to the
doctrines of command responsibility and acting under orders, even where they have
otherwise given short shrift to the general part of criminal law. See London Charter, supra
note 50, at art. 8 (superior orders); Allied Control Council Law No. 10, art. 1I(4)(b), Dec. 20,
1945 (superior orders); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art.
87, Dec. 12, 1977 (duty of commanders); ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at art. 7(3)
(command responsibility); id. at art. 7(4) (superior orders); ICTR Statute, supra note 42, at
art. 6(3) (command responsibility); id. at art. 6(4) (superior orders).
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the ICC, whose statute expressly contemplates that it may not reflect customary
international law. 274 The Statute's relative detail need not represent universal norms
but may instead reflect agreements and compromises among states necessary to
attract support for that particular tribunal. In this context, specificity in the law may
serve various purposes-including constraining the delegated discretion of
international judges, easing the court's administration, and avoiding divisions over
lighting rods such as the death penalty-without prejudicing the application of
different law in other procedural contexts where the same concerns do not apply. 275
Although the focus of this Article is substantive, rather than procedural, criminal
law, the concept of tribunal-specific law also readily embraces differences in the
criminal procedure used to prosecute ICL offenses in different courts.
3. Limits on Domestic Law
A third category of ICL deals with general questions of criminal law, where the
specific purposes of ICL do not override reasonable differences among national
systems. Rather than impose a single uniform approach, ICL should instead focus
on constraining the acceptable margin of state discretion to apply local law to the
prosecution of ICL offenses.
I have already discussed the example of duress in detail. A similar approach
could extend to other defenses, as well as to general standards of individual
responsibility. One example is mens rea. Although the definitions of ICL offenses
typically contain special mental elements that are central to the offense and are
appropriately universal-for example, the definition of genocidal intent, or the
requirements that perpetrators of crimes against humanity act with knowledge of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population-different legal
systems might still require that culpability for underlying criminal acts conform
with their respective general approaches to mens rea. For example, common law
and civil law systems might maintain their admittedly subtle distinction between
culpable recklessness, on the one hand, and dolus eventualis,on the other hand.
National criminal justice systems also differ in defining forms of personal
responsibility. In Prosecutorv. Furunditja,for example, an ICTY Trial Chamber
relied almost exclusively on a handful of seemingly contradictory World War II-era
precedents to announce an international criminal law of aiding and abetting.2 7 7
Given that aiding and abetting is a generally applicable form of criminal
participation, and that national systems differ on how to define it, the ICTY could
have given greater weight to former Yugoslav law. The doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise (JCE) presents a somewhat more difficult problem.278 One might defend
the ICTY's development of JCE (or perhaps defend some alternate standards for
group criminality) on the ground that the doctrine is specially tailored to confront

274. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part IV.C.
276. FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 194, § 6.5.2.
277. Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement,
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
278. See supra notes 62, 90.

187-249 (Int'l
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problems of mass criminality that are a central focus of ICL offenses.2 7 9 On the
other hand, the controversy surrounding that doctrine-combined with the ICC's
apparent retreat from it-suggests that ICL may do better to simply incorporate
existing national approaches to group criminality. 28 0
Perhaps most significantly, my approach suggests that ICL should abandon the
search for uniform principles of sentencing.281 Rather than assure consistent
sentences for all ICL offenders, ICL should promote consistency with applicable
domestic sentencing practices. Thus, ICL should generally defer to national
judgments concerning appropriate sentencing ranges and seek to ensure that ICL
offenders receive sentences that are consistent with what national law would
consider appropriate for offenses of like gravity under similar circumstances. ICL
should also defer to national judgments concerning the appropriate mix of
retributive and utilitarian considerations in sentencing.
In none of these cases do I contemplate ICL extending blanket deference to
national law. Instead, ICL should operate to establish limits on the acceptable range
of domestic discretion. In particular, ICL should ensure that any application of
national law conforms to evolving international human rights standards, does not
frustrate core purposes of ICL, and maintains consistency with the national law's
general approach to criminal culpability. Thus, ICL must not operate to endorse
cruel and unusual punishment or violate core principles of individual responsibility
and fair notice. It must also ensure that applicable domestic law would not operate
to deny the special gravity of the offense at issue.282 Within appropriate limits,
however, ICL may nevertheless tolerate diversity among domestic laws.
Once again, of course, there is room for reasonable disagreement on precisely
what range of discretion ICL should be afforded, and the aim of this Article is more
to provide a framework for analyzing and debating these issues than to achieve
clarity on the exact demands of ICL with respect to every application of my model.
That said, one can already see distinctions along the lines I am proposing in the

279. See, e.g., Damaika, supra note 178, at 352 ("(JCE's] animating idea-that of
reaching criminal masterminds-is sound. It responds to the fact that most international
crimes are committed in an organization context, so that looking for culprits is behind handson perpetrators makes eminent sense."). Damaika nevertheless laments that "[i]t is the
elaboration of that idea that causes concern. Under the presently prevailing understanding,
the scope of membership in the enterprise, as well as its temporal and spatial range, are
uncertain and liable to arbitrary extension." Id.
280. See supra notes 62, 89.
281. In this respect, my approach contrasts with recent work that has focused on
establishing a coherent, uniform framework of ICL sentencing. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin,
Towards a Unique Theory of International Criminal Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 373 (G6ran Sluiter & Sergey
Vasiliev eds., 2009); William Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human
Rights Approach, 462 DUKE J. INT'L L. 461 (1996); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive
Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the
PotentialofInternational Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2007).
282. For example, while domestic law may supply general sentencing ranges, ICL must
still assert the relative gravity of ICL offenses. A state may not, for instance, rank rape
behind shoplifting in its sentencing scheme. Similarly, ICL should generally not allow states
to adopt more lenient standards of culpability for ICL offenses than for domestic offenses.
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practice of international tribunals. For example, both the ICTR and ICTY have
referred some of their indictments to domestic jurisdictions pursuant to the
tribunals' respective procedural rules.283 While the ICTR Appeals Chamber has
refused to refer cases to jurisdictions that do not expressly distinguish genocide
from murder in their domestic law,284 the ICTY has referred cases to a Bosnian
court that that applies some general principles of Bosnian law to the prosecution of
ICL offenses. 285 Notably, the applicable statute codifies the old Yugoslav law of
duress to ICL offenses, rather than the ICTY's Erdemovid approach.
Although
the case law does not expressly recognize these distinctions, this aspect of the
tribunals' referral practice affirms the idea that different aspects of ICL should be
given different weight for purposes of demanding uniformity.
4. Default Rules
A fourth and final category consists of default ICL rules for situations where
there is no appropriate or available domestic law to apply. It may be the case that
ICL confronts crimes committed in a failed state with no legal system to speak of,
or by a regime whose law so departs from acceptable standards of human rights
that there is no room for deference. A state's laws may be irredeemably vague on a
matter vital to the prosecution of an ICL offense. ICL may confront a pattern of
criminality that deeply implicates so many different jurisdictions that it becomes
impossible to identify a single jurisdiction with a greatest interest in the case. In
such cases, it is desirable for ICL to develop default rules that may be applied to
ensure prosecution of JCL offenses consistent with the legality principle.
ICL already possesses the basic foundation of a default law in the Rome Statute
of the ICC, whose geographic reach is potentially universal.2 8 7 Even states that
have not joined the Court may find themselves subject to its jurisdiction, at the
discretion of the U.N. Security Council, with respect to crimes committed after the
Rome Statute entered into force. 288 The Rome Statute is, of course, binding law
when applied by the ICC itself."8 At the same time, the Court's broad geographic
reach renders the Statute a convenient source of law for other courts and tribunals

283. See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11 bis (as amended Mar. 14,
2008) (providing for the referral of indictments to other courts); ICTY Rules of Procedure

and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 44, Rule 11 bis (as amended Dec. 10, 2009) (same).
284. See supranote 272.

285. See Krivicni Zakon Bosne i Hercegovine [KZBiH] (Criminal Code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina], arts. 173-84, Sluibeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine [Official Gazette of
Bosnia and Herzegovina], No. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 2006. See generally
William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of InternationalCriminal Tribunals: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State
Court ofBosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279(2008).

286. See Krivicni Zakon Bosne i Hercegovine [KZBiH) [Criminal Code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina), art. 25, Sluibeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine (Official Gazette of Bosnia and
Herzegovina], No. 3/03, 32/03, 37/03, 54/04, 61/04, 30/05, 2006.
287. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
288. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 13(b).
289. Id at art. 20.
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not so bound, while reducing the retroactivity concerns that have marked the prior
history of ICL.
By labeling this use of the Rome Statute as one of "default rules," my point is to
convey its nonmandatory nature. In other words, to the extent that some of the
ICC's law is merely the law of the tribunal and not universally binding ICL, its
availability in other fora should not preclude appropriate deference to domestic law
where the conditions for such deference are otherwise met. Default rules may
nevertheless be desirable to cover situations where domestic law is inadequate or
silent.
B. Forum-SpecificApplications
As should already be evident, the specific application of my four-tiered
framework depends to some extent on which court or tribunal is applying ICL.
Below I briefly consider the implications of the model in three procedural settings:
(1) domestic courts, (2) international tribunals, and (3) hybrid tribunals.
1. Domestic Courts
The implications of my framework are perhaps most obvious for domestic
courts trying ICL offenses in circumstances where the court hearing the case is the
court that, under normal circumstances, would be expected to do so. In such cases,
the domestic court should be free to apply its own domestic criminal law, subject to
its incorporation of universally applicable ICL and its conformity with limits on
acceptable domestic discretion, Among other implications, this means that
domestic courts need not apply the identical criminal law applied by international
tribunals. In the context of the ICC especially, it suggests that, pursuant to the
ICC's complementarity framework, the ICC may defer to genuine investigations
and prosecutions whose substantive criminal law does not mirror the ICC's law. 290
The case of courts trying ICL offenses purely based on principles of universal
jurisdiction is more complex, as there are now multiple potentially competing legal
regimes in play. 291 There are the demands of international law, the demands of the
national jurisdiction or jurisdictions that would normally be expected to prosecute
the case based on traditional jurisdictional principles, and the law of the court
exercising universal jurisdiction. Although the multiplicity of potentially applicable
laws might suggest that uniform default rules should apply in all such cases, that is
not the inevitable solution. To the extent practicable, the prosecuting jurisdiction
might, for example, resort to rules of dual criminality that favor the application of
criminal legal principles that are shared by both the prosecuting state and the state
that would normally be expected to assert jurisdiction. Doing so would preserve the
diversity of domestic law while minimizing concerns of fair notice to the accused.
It is debatable, moreover, whether domestic courts need even go so far.
Notwithstanding the theoretical reach of the concept of universal jurisdiction, states
have generally proved reluctant to abandon completely traditional principles of

290. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
291. See supranotes 230-35 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction requiring some connection between the crime and the prosecuting
forum. 292 The two states that have come the closest to recognizing universal
jurisdiction in its purest forum-Spain and Belgium-have both amended their
statutes so as to privilege linkages between the forum and defendant.293 The future
of ICL prosecutions in domestic courts is therefore likely to concentrate in
jurisdictions that have a reasonable basis to apply their domestic laws to the
offenses at issue.
2. International Tribunals
With respect to international tribunals, I have already argued that the ICTY
should have applied the Yugoslav law of duress. More broadly, my framework
suggests ad hoc tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR could have made better use of
domestic law to fill the broad interstices of the their respective statutes.
The ICC presents a different context given the relative detail of its Statute. For
many issues, therefore, the Court will simply apply its own binding statutory law.
There are, however, at least two circumstances in which the ICC could embrace a
broader, more diverse view of ICL.
First, as I have just explained, the ICC's complementarity process need not
require domestic courts prosecuting ICL offenses to incorporate the entirety of the
Rome Statute's law. A national court applying some national law to ICL offenses
may still claim deference from the ICC if this yields different outcomes than would
have resulted from application of the Rome Statute.
Second, the ICC may still resort to national law in cases where the ICC's own
law is unclear. Doing so would be consistent with at least one reasonable
interpretation of Article 21, which contemplates the resort to
[Gleneral principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate,the national laws
of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and
with international law and internationally recognized norms and
standards. 294
The significance of this provision necessarily depends on the Court's
interpretive approach. If the ICC interprets its statute and customary international
law as broadly as the ICTY has, for example, then it may leave no room for Article

292. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 L.C.J. 3.
(Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal) (surveying
national laws). The view that universal jurisdiction should respect a hierarchy of
jurisdictional priorityhas also gained acceptance among influential scholars. See supra note
161.
293. See Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, The Swan Song of Universal Jurisdiction in
Spain, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 777, 803-04 (2009); Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes
Statute:.A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 891-92 (2003).
294. Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 21(l)(c) (emphasis added); see supra notes 100107 and accompanying text.
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21 's residual resort to domestic law. My framework, by contrast, suggests that the
ICC need not fear gaps in international law, and that greater resort to domestic
principles may be desirable.
Of those areas where the Rome Statute does leave major gaps, among the most
significant, once again, is sentencing.295 Here, the ICC should resist the urge to
develop a single, uniform sentencing approach applicable to all its cases, and
should instead integrate, subject to the qualifications of my framework, the
sentencing law of the jurisdiction that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
offense.
3. Hybrid Tribunals
The statutes of so-called "hybrid" tribunals already present a close fit for my
model given that these courts typically exercise jurisdiction over some domestic
crimes in addition to ICL offenses. This incorporation of domestic offenses ensures
that the tribunal will embrace at least some principles of domestic law. That said,
my approach argues for greater clarity in the way that domestic and international
law interact at hybrid tribunals. For example, the statute of the hybrid Cambodian
court prosecuting Khmer Rouge offenses, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, provides for jurisdiction both over defined domestic crimes296
and over core ICL crimes.297 Because the statute does not contain a general part, the
law leaves open the possibility that the court will apply entirely separate principles
to domestic and international crimes. Thus, a court following this framework might
acquit someone in Erdemovi6's position of all domestic offenses on the ground that
domestic law excuses the conduct, but then convict the same offender of war
crimes or crimes against humanity on the theory that customary international law
denies the defense. My framework, by contrast, would recognize that international
law is domestic law for these purposes and that domestic law may inform the
prosecution of both domestic and international offenses.
CONCLUSION

The implications of ICL for substantive criminal law remain an under-theorized
area of inquiry. The dominant aspiration to develop a general criminal law specific
to ICL focuses insufficient attention on both the goals of ICL and the pluralism
inherent in its creation. ICL, after all, is a species of criminal law. So long as
national legal systems continue to embrace different views on the nature and
consequences of criminality, the introduction of a distinctly international criminal
law will inevitably perpetuate or foster unequal treatment of one form or another.
This Article confronts the pluralism of ICL head on, and argues that the theory
of ICL must take better account of the environment in which this body of law
operates. I have argued that the goals of ICL do not speak with equal voice on all
matters of the law's content and that the evolution of ICL will be better served by a

295. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
296. ECCC Statute, supra note 25, at arts. 4-6.

297. Id. at art. 3.
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more nuanced, multi-layered account of the law. In this context, the Article makes
several arguments for reform. The ultimate aspiration, however, is a broader one: to
invite deeper inquiry into the normative foundations of ICL's substantive law. This
Article marks one contribution to that broader project.

